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Negotiation and other lawyering processes emerged during the past decade as
legitimate subjects for study and teaching both within legal academe, and among the
practicing bar.2 This recognition rests on the premise that a body of knowledge exists
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1. The study of lawyering skills as a separate discipline emerged predominantly from law school clinical education
in which students receive academic credit for working with actual clients and their cases. In the early years of clinical
education, its proponents stressed the social service benefits of having law students represent indigent clients. William
Pincus, a pioneer of the clinical movement, articulated these goals in 1969:
So far as society is concerned it sorely needs the services which only law students and their professors can
provide in the great mass of individual cases involving the "little man".... It behooves legal educators and
law students to learn that they will be great movers of social forces if they act forcefully and directly where their
talents and position give them strategic influence on what nowadays appears to be the small matter of obtaining
justice for an individual.
W. PINcUs, A Statement on CLEPR's Program, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR LAw STUDEsrTs 71-72 (1980).
A change of emphasis in the goals of clinical education occurred in the mid-1970s; this shift is symbolized by the
publication of Professors Bellow and Moulton's seminal work, The Lanyering Process: Materials For Clinical Instruction
in Advocacy. Professors Bellow and Moulton intended it to be used primarily as a text by students working in clinical
programs. According to the authors, "It asks the student practitioner to describe and generalize from his or her law
practice .... " G. BELLow & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS. MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY
xix (1978). They state that the materials in the text "are not intended to communicate a particular body of information
to the student. The readings, models and commentary are not to be learned.'" Id. at xxiv. Nevertheless, Professors
Bellow and Moulton acknowledge that "lawyer work can be analyzed and discussed in much the same way as a piece of
literature or an appellate case, and that reasoning from analogy offers a useful way to connect theory with practice." Id.
at xxiii. By 1982, a survey conducted by the Committee on Teaching Materials of the American Association of Law
Schools revealed that 46 of the 103 law schools with clinical programs which responded to a survey questionnaire
identified "negotiations" or other lawyering skills as subjects taught in clinical courses. See Survey Results: Memoran-
dum from Committee on Teaching Materials to American Association of Law Schools Clinical Education Section
Members 44-48 (Jan. 4, 1983) (copy on file with author).
Since the publication of The Laivyering Process, the study of lawyering skills has emerged as an independent
discipline; lawyering skills are taught in courses using educational methods other than actual cases, such as simulated
negotiation and interviewing exercises, demonstrations and lecture and discussion. See. e.g., Coleman, Teaching the
Theory and Practice of Bargaining to Laisyers and Students, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 470 (1980); Ortwein, Teaching
Negotiation: A Valuable Experience, 31 J. LEGAL EDuC. 108 (1981). The teaching of negotiation theory and technique has
even penetrated the first-year law school curriculum. See Margolick, The Trouble With American Law Schools, N.Y.
Times, May 22, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 20, 32 (description of first-year course called "Lawyering Process" at Stanford
Law School).
During this same period of time, "there has been a virtual explosion of books about negotiation." Menkel-Meadow,
Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AMt B. FOUND RESEARCH J. 905, 905. Professor
Menkel-Meadow provides an excellent description and synthesis of contributions to the study of legal negotiations between
1977 and 1983. See id. at 905 n. I for a listing of these recent works.
2. See generally ILLINOIS INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.. ATroRNEY's GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS (1979); M.
NEUCEN & M. ScHoENRELD. PROBIENMS AND CASES IN IrTERVIEWINo. COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATION (1983); Schoenfield,
Strategies and Techniques for Successful Negotiations, 69 A.B.A. J. 1226 (1983).
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which can assist lawyers in becoming more effective at skills such as negotiating and
interviewing. 3 For example, Professors Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton, pioneers in
lawyering skills education, begin their discussion of negotiations by presenting "a
model- a set of simplifying assumptions to help you better understand an area of
lawyer work." 4 Similarly, Professor Gerald Williams acknowledges that throughout
his text on legal negotiation the question, "What does it mean to be an effective
negotiator?" is a "major concern." 5
Disagreement among legal negotiation theorists about which negotiation strategy
is most likely to be effective and the absence of a comprehensive theory of negotiation
strategies currently jeopardize the legitimacy of negotiation as an academic discipline.
There is little or no consensus on whether a negotiator should pursue a competitive 6
or an accommodative 7 approach when dealing with the other party; instead, legal
negotiation theorists espouse directly conflicting advice. Most of the early texts used
in law schools to teach negotiations focused on the "competitive strategy" and, at
least implicitly, endorsed such a strategy.8 In 1981, Professors Roger Fisher and
William Ury published their seminal book, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In, in which they severely criticized the competitive theory9 and
advanced "the method of principled negotiation developed at the Harvard Negotia-
tion Project . . . ." 1 Their strategy is largely based on a problem-solving or inte-
grative approach, t and Professors Fisher and Ury claim that it is "an all purpose
3. Texts written by law professors and used to teach negotiations include the following: H. EDWARDS & J. WHIm,
PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR (1977); R. FISHER & W. URY, GErING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETnLtEN'r (1983). These
texts borrow heavily from the research and recommendations of social scientists, particularly social psychologists who
have studied bargaining. See, e.g., H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, supra, at 67-68; G. WILLIAMS, supra, at 44-45, 48-58; see
also G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note I, at 445-555. This cognitive approach to understanding negotiation contrasts
sharply with the way that most lawyers learn to negotiate. Gerard Nierenberg, a lawyer, describes the process by which
most lawyers are educated: "Many people, due to their lack of awareness of any structured approach to the negotiating
process, are forced to reuse self-taught methods that have merely appeared to work in the past-methods that were
acquired, like diseases, from social contact." G. NIERENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF NEGOTIATING Xi (1973).
4. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 445.
5. G. WILUAMS, supra note 3, at 7. In an article specifically dealing with negotiation strategy, Professor Gary
Lowenthal convincingly argues that "certain strategic decisions," which must be made by each party in all negotiations,
"can and should be planned systematically, according to general principles applicable to all negotiations." Lowenthal,
A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69, 69 (1982). In the analogous
context of interviewing and counseling, Professors Binder and Price express similar goals: "Our intention is to provide
general models which can be used as a foundation for leaming to become an effective interviewer and counselor. The
models are intended to serve as basic guidelines, as a way to begin." D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSEUNG: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH vi (1977).
6. See infra notes 56-88 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 445-555; H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, supra note 3, at
7-163; C. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING AME 12-26 (1970).
9. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at xii.
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text for a complete description of the integrative strategy. During
the last several years, much of the attention directed toward legal negotiation theory has been focused specifically on the
problem-solving or integrative strategy. See generally R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3; Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). This interest is
linked to the contemporaneous emergence of mediation and other alternative dispute resolution methods as appropriate
topics for legal scholarship and education. See, e.g., Riskin, Mediation and Lanyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
Integrative strategy theorists sometimes appear driven by a desire to proselytize. Professor Menkel-Meadow states
that "[tihis effort is motivated by a desire to see the legal system work in a way which promotes and maximizes human
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strategy" 1 2 that can be used in any negotiation. Two years later, Professor Gerald
Williams published another text on legal negotiation and concluded that a third
negotiation strategy, the cooperative strategy, is most likely to be effective in any
given negotiation.13
The lawyer or law student who wishes to study negotiation strategies is faced,
therefore, with three possible negotiation strategies, each of which is claimed by some
negotiation experts to be superior to the other two. The confusion is exacerbated
because no one has codified a generally accepted typology or terminology of
negotiation strategies. Although leading negotiation theorists share a common un-
derstanding of what constitutes the competitive strategy, 14 there is little consistency
in the descriptions and names of noncompetitive theories. Noncompetitive strategies
are variously referred to as collaborative,' 5 cooperative,' 6 and problem-solving.'
7
This article recommends a typology for negotiation strategies' 8 and outlines
three distinct negotiating strategies: competitive, cooperative, and integrative. This
system of nomenclature is adapted from social scientists who have studied bargaining
interactions that are creative, enfranchising, enriching, and empowering, rather than alienating and conflict-provoking."
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 763. Through problem-solving negotiation, according to Professor Menkel-Meadow,
"negotiators have an opportunity to transform an intimidating, mystifying process into one which will better serve the
needs of those who require it. Whether or not this will work, we don't yet know. But what can we lose by trying?" Id.
at 842. She acknowledges that "[t]eaching alternative models of negotiation, such as problem-solving or integrative
models, may be easier and more subversive with law students than with practitioners-the former don't realize they are
being taught anything different." Menkel-Meadow, supra note I, at 934.
Professor Menkel-Meadow and other problem-solving theorists are correct when they argue that attorneys trained in
the adversary system frequently miss opportunities for problem-solving. This article, however, advocates that an effective
negotiator should be able to use any of three separate strategies in an appropriate context and that a strong inclination to
apply any single strategy in all contexts may be disadvantageous. Somewhat ironically, Professor Menkel-Meadow also
finds the "assumption of universal applicability" when suggested by competitive negotiation theorists to be "astound-
ing." Menkel-Meadow, supra note I1, at 776.
12. R. FtsHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at xiii. Recently, Professor Fisher acknowledged that his thinking has
changed and that there are at least some instances in which a strategy other than principled negotiation is likely to be most
advantageous. See Fisher, The Pros and Cons of Getting to Yes, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120, 123 (1984) (printed as epilogue
to White, Book Review, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115 (1984) (reviewing R. Ftstsn & W. URY, GEMNG TO YEs: NEGOTnATtON
AREsFsstmr WrmouT GtvtN IN (1981))). Professor Fisher reports that "o]n the first day of my most recent negotiation
course I tore a paperback copy [of Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In] in half to convince students
how much work we had yet to do." Id. at 120.
13. G. WiLutas, supra note 3, at 19, 41.
14. Compare G. WtLIAMS, supra note 3, at 48-52 with Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 73-92.
15. See Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 73. Professor Lowenthal's collaborative strategy appears to encompass both
of the noncompetitive strategies described below: cooperative, see infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text, and
integrative, see infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text. See also infra note 40 and accompanying text.
16. See G. Wi.uA is, supra note 3, at 53. Professor Williams' cooperative strategy corresponds closely with the
cooperative strategy described below. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. Professor Williams fails to separately
identify the integrative strategy. See infra notes 40-47, 105-11 and accompanying text.
17. See G. BELLow & B. MouLToN, supra note 1, at 575. Professor Menkel-Meadow, unlike other legal negotiation
theorists who generally identify only two negotiation strategies, describes four approaches: "(I) conventional adversarial;
(2) problem solving (meeting needs); (3) fair or objective negotiation (solutions mediated by outside standards where needs
are not the only criteria); (4) conventional cooperative (compromise)." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1I, at 816 n.243.
18. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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strategies,' 9 although even these theorists use varying terminologies. 20 Section II
describes the basic ingredients of each strategy and the characteristics which distin-
guish each one from the other strategies. Section II also argues that a negotiator often
can change a negotiation strategy during a single negotiation. Professor Dean Pruitt,
a social psychologist, first suggested this idea and labelled it the "strategic choice
model." 21
Section III discusses how a negotiator should decide which strategy to employ
in a specific negotiation. 22 Social scientists, and more recently law professors, 23 have
identified a number of factors to consider in choosing between the three strategies.
This section attempts to provide a more comprehensive list of relevant factors than has
previously been available to those interested in legal negotiation. These factors are
organized into two groups: (1) factors to consider in deciding between a competitive
and noncompetitive strategy;24 and (2) factors to consider in deciding between the two
noncompetitive strategies, cooperative and integrative.
25
A list of factors to be considered in choosing a negotiation strategy, by itself,
however, is limited in its usefulness. When all of the factors considered suggest the
same strategy, no problem arises. 26 In the more likely event that the factors point to
different strategies, however, a mere list provides no guidance to the negotiator
seeking to choose the most effective strategy. 27 Legal negotiation theorists have failed
to indicate how factors suggesting different strategies should be ranked in importance
or how they should be balanced against each other. Ultimately the negotiator is left
to rely on his own instincts, albeit instincts that are somewhat better educated.
Providing only a list of factors also ignores the reality that the process of analyzing
such factors in a particular negotiation is a terribly complex operation to be under-
taken by a negotiator on an ad hoc basis, even in the unlikely event that the negotiator
is schooled in negotiation theory.
19. The competitive strategy is described in D. PRurrr, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 15, 71-89 (1981). Social scientists
sometimes refer to this strategy as the "rivalist" strategy, L. FOURAKER & S. SIGEL, BARGAINING BEHAVIOR 67 (1963),
or the "tough" strategy, Harnett, Cummings & Hamner, Personality, Bargaining Style and Payoffin Bilateral Monopoly
Bargaining Among European Managers, 36 SoctoMEm'Ry 325, 328 (1973). The "cooperative strategy" is a generic term
used by Professor Williams to describe negotiation strategies recommending unilateral concessions and seeking agree-
ments fair and just to both parties. See G. WILuiAms, supra note 3, at 53-54; see also D. PRurrr, supra, at 15, 91; Bartos,
Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View, in THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS: THEORIES AND APtcATcnONs 13
(I. Zartman ed. 1978). Variations of the cooperative strategy have been referred to as the "soft," "intermediate," and
"fair" strategies. See Hamett, Cummings & Hamner, supra, at 328. The integrative strategy is described in D. PRurrr,
supra, at 137-200.
20. For example, Professors Hamett, Cummings, and Hamner identify four separate strategies. See Harnett,
Cummings & Hamner, supra note 19, at 328. Similarly, Professors Horowitz and Willging identify five distinct strategies,
see I. HoRowrrz & T. WnL.oNo, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW: INTEGRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 284 (1984), and Professor
Pruitt finds five totally different strategies, see Pruitt, Strategic Choice in Negotiation, 27 Am. BEHAVIORAL Sciwerisr 167,
167 (1983).
21. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 15. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 759 n. 10.
22. See infra notes 140-238, 244 and accompanying text.
23. See generally D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 21-46, 84-89, 107-27 (social scientists). See Lowenthal, supra note
5, at 92-112; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 928-29 n.288; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 828-29 (law
professors).
24. See infra notes 148-214 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 215-38 and accompanying text.
26. See Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 112.
27. See id.; see also infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
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This article argues that it is possible to identify a negotiation strategy which is
likely to succeed throughout an entire field of legal negotiations, such as plea
bargaining or personal injury negotiations. 28 Within each substantive area of nego-
tiation, certain systemic characteristics recur; in choosing a negotiation strategy, the
importance of these characteristics outweighs the effects of idiosyncratic facts in most
negotiations. Accordingly, by applying the factors to be used in choosing a negoti-
ation strategy to the characteristics of a particular type of negotiation, a negotiator can
determine systemically a recommended strategy. Although a somewhat different
strategy may sometimes be dictated by the peculiar facts of a specific transaction, the
recommended strategy for the context in which the negotiation occurs can serve as a
guideline or starting point for the negotiator. The ability to prescribe a strategy for a
specific type of negotiation enables negotiation theory to provide meaningful advice
for the real world negotiator: by doing so, the study of negotiation in professional
education is legitimated.
This article proceeds to apply this general theory to three specific situations
involving strategy selection: (1) the defense attorney's strategy in plea bargaining;29
(2) the plaintiff's attorney's negotiation strategy in personal injury negotiations;30 and
(3) the management attorney's strategy in labor negotiations. 31 In each context, the
recurring characteristics of the bargaining milieu are applied to the factors previously
identified as relevant to the choice of a negotiation strategy and a strategy likely to
be effective is recommended.
II. A BASIC TYPOLOGY OF NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES
The type of negotiation strategy likely to yield the most favorable outcome for
a client is an important question, because the attorney is professionally obligated to
seek an advantageous result for her client in all negotiations. 32 During the last twenty
years, negotiation theorists from various disciplines including law,33 social psychol-
ogy, 34 economics, 35 and international relations36 have debated vigorously the at-
tributes of various approaches to negotiation. This section defines the characteristics
of three primary negotiation strategies and suggests that the negotiator's view of his
relationship with the other party is the primary determinant that identifies each theory
28. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 245-307 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 308-52 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 353-400 and accompanying text.
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble (1983) which provides: "As negotiator, a lawyer seeks
a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others." See also id. at Rule
1.3 comment; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONStBILtrrY EC 7-1, DR 7-101 (1976).
33. See, e.g., G. Wiut-Ns, supra note 3, at 41, 47-54; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 69.
34. See generally L. FouRAKER & S. SIEGEL, supra note 19; D. PRurrT, supra note 19; R. WALTON & R. McKEasis,
A BEmAVzORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATION (1965); Deutsch, Cooperation and Trust: Some Theoretical Notes, in
CoNmstpoRARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 121 (D. Johnson ed. 1973); Spector, Negotiation as a Psychological Process, 21 J.
CoNFLIcr RESOLUTION 607 (1977).
35. See generally BARGOAiNo: FORMAL THsotoss OF NEGOTATION, 131-242 (0. Young ed. 1975); A. CODDINOTON,
THso~tus OF TmE BARGAINIG PROCESS (1968); J. CROSS, Tim ECONO.ICs OF BARoiim o 42-68 (1969).
36. See generally R. FisHEm & W. URY, supra note 3; Tim NEGOTIATION PROCESS: THEoRIES AND APPLIcATnoNs
111-224 (I. Zartman ed. 1978); C. OSGOOD, AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER (1962).
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and distinguishes it from the others. The competitive negotiator seeks to force the
opposing party to a settlement favorable to the negotiator by convincing the opponent
that his case is not as strong as previously thought and that he should settle the case. 37
The cooperative strategy mandates that the negotiator make concessions to build trust
in the other party and encourage further concessions on his part. 38 The third strategy,
integrative bargaining, seeks to find solutions to the conflict which satisfy the interests
of both parties. 39
The cooperative and integrative strategies are separate and distinct, even though
some legal negotiation theorists fail to distinguish them. 40 The two noncompetitive
strategies4 1 are similar; the goal of both is to create a nonadversarial atmosphere in
which the parties can work toward an agreement. 42 Aside from sharing this objective,
however, the strategies involve quite different tactics. Under the cooperative strategy,
the negotiator makes concessions in anticipation that his opponent will reciprocate
and that the parties will move closer to a compromise resolution. 43 The cooperative
strategy is the noncompetitive strategy most likely to be used in a "share bargain-
ing" 44 or "distributive bargaining" 45 situation, that is, where the parties must divide
a fixed quantity of resources. The integrative strategy, on the other hand, is not a
concession based strategy that seeks to divide a fixed pie; rather, it maximizes the
parties' potential for problem-solving in order to increase the joint benefit and expand
the pie. It is incorrect, however, to view the cooperative and integrative strategies
solely as aspects of a single accomodative or collaborative strategy functioning in two
different contexts. Even in an apparently distributive or share bargaining situation, the
37. See G. WILLIAtS, supra note 3, at 48-49; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 74, 90. Professors Fouraker and Siegel's
Bargaining Behavior was the seminal exposition of competitive strategy principles.
38. See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
40. Professor Lowenthal's concept of collaborative bargaining, for example, includes both "'problem solving," see
Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 72, and "a trading process in which each party will compromise her opening position in return
for a matching compromise by the other side." Id. at 75. The trading process described by Professor Lowenthal is the
core of the cooperative strategy. See infra notes 43-45, 89-102 and accompanying text. Other negotiation theorists
previously distinguished the cooperative strategy from the integrative strategy. For example, Professor Menkel-Meadow
highlights the distinctions between problem-solving and adversarial negotiation, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at
757-60, but recognizes that there may be two additional approaches which she calls fair or objective negotiation and
conventional cooperative negotiation. See id. at 816 n.243. This article suggests that these last alternatives identified by
Professor Menkel-Meadow are different aspects of a single strategy-the cooperative strategy. Similarly, Professors Fisher
and Ury acknowledge the existence of the cooperative strategy in a pejorative manner when they contrast their principled
negotiation not only with hard negotiation (the competitive strategy), but with soft negotiation (the cooperative strategy).
R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 13.
41. The term noncompetitive strategies is used in a technical sense to mean strategies that are premised on a positive
working relationship with the negotiating party, as opposed to those based on attempts to undermine the opposing party.
It is certainly not used in the colloquial sense to suggest that these strategies are not effective and cannot compete with
the competitive strategy. See D. PRurITr, supra note 19, at 91.
42. The requisite atmosphere for cooperative bargaining is one characterized by trust. See infra notes 89-91 and
accompanying text; see also D. Ptsurrr, supra note 19, at 124-25. A problem-solving orientation is required for the
integrative approach. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text; see also D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 182.
43. See D. Ptorrr, supra note 19, at 91; Hamner, Effects of Bargaining Strategy and Pressure to Reach Agreement
in a Stalemated Negotiation, 30 J. PetsoNALrrv & Soc. PSYCHOLoGy 458, 466 (1974); see also infra notes 89-96 and
accompanying text.
44. See C. KARtASS, supra note 8, at 66.
45. See R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 34, at 13; see also White, Book Review, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 115,
116 (1984) (reviewing R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOnATING AGREaMNT We'roUtr GIVING IN (1981)). Share
or distributive bargaining is also referred to as "a zero-sum game." See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
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integrative negotiator strives to identify problem-solving solutions which are not
readily perceived. 46 In contrast, the cooperative negotiator initiates the concession
swapping process.47
Negotiation strategies must be distinguished from the personal styles of nego-
tiators. Professor Gerald Williams' recent text on legal negotiations tends to blur this
distinction by using the same descriptive labels, cooperative and competitive, to
describe both negotiators' styles48 and negotiation strategies. 49 Professor Williams'
work focuses on an empirical study of effective attorneys' characteristics as evaluated
by other attorneys.50 He labels negotiators who are described by other attorneys as
being forthright, trustful, logical (not emotional), courteous, personable, friendly,
and tactful as cooperative.5' On the other hand, Professor Williams describes the
competitive negotiator as dominant, forceful, aggressive, attacking, ambitious, ego-
tistical, arrogant, and clever.52 Professor Williams' focus on the personal character-
istics of the attorney leads him to the cynical and confining conclusion that
"[i]ndividual negotiators may not have much choice about the basic approach they
use, which may be determined largely by one's own personality and experience." ' 53
A negotiation strategy is a separate and distinct concept from the negotiator's
personal characteristics; a strategy is the negotiator's planned and systematic attempt
to move the negotiation process toward a resolution favorable to his client's interests.
Negotiation strategy consists of the decisions made regarding the opening bid and the
subsequent modifications of proposals. Admittedly, strategy and personal style are
frequently intertwined. A negotiator who has a "forceful, aggressive, and attacking"
personal style frequently will succeed in causing an opponent to lose confidence in
himself or his case thereby inducing substantial unilateral concessions, a goal of the
competitive strategy. In another instance, however, a negotiator who is "courteous,
46. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 772-75, 785-89.
47. The failure of legal negotiation theorists to separately identify and describe the cooperative strategy may result
from the inherent limitations on researching and teaching negotiation theory using simulations. In a simulated distributive
bargaining situation, the competitive strategy usually yields a better quantitative result than the cooperative strategy. See
infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. Simulations are not designed to force students or research subjects to deal with
the consequences of a competitive strategy, such as damage to continuing relationships, see infra notes 180-84 and
accompanying text, stalemates in negotiations, see infra notes 163-79 and accompanying text, and violations of
professional norms, see infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text. In much the same way, students engaged in
problem-solving bargaining simulations generally experience both personal satisfaction and positive reinforcement from
the instructor when they devise an integrative solution that satisfies both parties' interests. Conversely, there is little
positive feedback in simulated negotiations for initiating concessions. Paradoxically, the only published empirical study
of attorneys' negotiating behavior suggests that the cooperative strategy is the strategy most widely used by lawyers. See
G. Wt.uAms, supra note 3, at 19. This contradiction suggests both that the cooperative strategy may be a more viable
alternative in the actual practice of legal negotiations than it is in simulated student exercises, and, more broadly, that there
are some limitations on the applicability of research simulations to the practice of law.
48. See G. Wluts, supra note 3, at 18-40.
49. See id. at 47-54. Professor Williams acknowledges the distinction between style and strategy:
The descriptions of cooperative and competitive negotiators provide a basis for evaluating our personal
negotiating patterns and those of negotiators we may see in action. But the descriptions do not directly address
the question of how the cooperative and competitive strategies ivork: what are the dynamics of each strategy,
and what determines the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a negotiator's application of the strategy?
Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).
50. See id. at 17-20.
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 41.
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personable, and friendly" may, through competitive strategic moves such as high
opening demands and infrequent concessions, be even more successful in destroying
the opponent's confidence in his case and inducing unilateral concessions from the
opponent. Usually, a negotiator's personal characteristics positively correlate with his
preferred negotiating strategy. Separating personal style and negotiation strategies,
however, yields new flexibility for the negotiator.54 It is possible for negotiators with
cooperative personal characteristics to adopt a competitive strategy when it would be
advantageous, and naturally competitive individuals can adopt a cooperative strat-
egy.55 Further, a negotiator should often make competitive, cooperative, and inte-
grative moves within a single negotiation. If negotiation strategies are recognized as
something distinct from the personal style of negotiators, then the essential elements
of each strategy can be disseminated in writing and taught to prospective negotiators.
Short of psychoanalysis, however, it might be difficult or impossible to transform a
naturally "courteous, personable, and friendly" individual, even temporarily, into
someone who is "attacking, forceful, and aggressive."
A. The Competitive Strategy
The competitive negotiator tries to maximize the benefits for his client by
convincing his opponent to settle for less than she otherwise would have at the outset
of the negotiation process. 56 The basic premise underlying the competitive strategy is
that all gains for one's own client are obtained at the expense of the opposing party. 57
The strategy aims to convince the opposing party that her settlement alternative is not
as advantageous as she previously thought. Competitive tactics are designed to lessen
the opponent's confidence in her case, thereby inducing her to settle for less than she
originally asked. The competitive negotiator moves "psychologically against the
other person," 58 with behavior designed to unnerve the opponent.5 9 Competitive
negotiators expect similar behavior from their opponents and therefore mistrust
them.60 In undermining their opponents' confidence, competitive negotiators employ
a strategy which often includes the following tactics:
1. a high initial demand;
2. limited disclosure of information regarding facts and one's own preferences;
54. Id. at 49. Professor Williams admits that "we can all shift from one style to another or anywhere in between
under sufficient encouragement or provocation" and that "many effective attorneys have developed the capability to adopt
either style convincingly." Id. at 41.
55. See infra notes 148-238 and accompanying text for a general discussion of choosing between the competitive,
cooperative, and integrative strategies.
56. See R. WALTON & R. McKERsIE, supra note 34, at 59-82; G. WILLtAMS, supra note 3, at 49; Lowenthal, supra
note 5, at 83-84.
57. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 48-49; see also D. PRurrT, supra note 19, at 15; R. WALTON & R. McKE~ssE,
supra note 34, at 13; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 74.
58. G. WtLtIAMS, supra note 3, at 48-49; see also R. WALTON & R. McKERsE, supra note 34, at 59-82; Lowenthal,
supra note 5, at 83-88.
59. See S. SIEGEL & L. FOURAtER, BARGAINING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING: ExPERIMENTS IN BILATERAL MONOPOLY
100 (1960); Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 90; see also C. OSGOOD, supra note 36, at 53 (competitive military psychology
utilizes a "seesawing" arms race to achieve this effect).
60. See generally Schlenker & Goldman, Cooperators and Competitors in Conflict: A Test of the "Triangle
Model." 22 J. CONFLICT REsOLuTnON 393 (1978).
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3. few and small concessions;
4. threats and arguments; and
5.. apparent commitment to positions during the negotiating process.
A negotiator who utilizes the competitive strategy begins with a high initial
demand. 6 1 Empirical research repeatedly demonstrates a significant positive relation-
ship between a negotiator's original demand and his payoff.62 A high initial demand
conceals the negotiator's minimum settlement point and allows the negotiator to grant
concessions during the negotiating process 63 and still achieve a favorable result. The
negotiator's opening position may also include a false issue-a demand that the
negotiator does not really care about, but one that can be traded for concessions from
the opponent during the negotiation. 64 Generally, the more that the negotiator insists
upon a particular demand early in the negotiation, the larger the concession that
ultimately will be obtained from the opponent in exchange for dropping that de-
mand. 65 In addition, the opponent may have evaluated the negotiator's case more
favorably than the negotiator has; a high demand protects the negotiator from quickly
agreeing to a less favorable settlement than one which he might later obtain. If the
demand is high but credible, 66 the opponent's response to the demand may also
educate the negotiator about how the opponent evaluates her own case.
67
The competitive negotiator selectively and strategically shares information with
his opponent. 68 He does not disclose the least favorable terms to which his client
would agree, that is, his minimum reservation point. 69 He prefers to obtain an even
more favorable settlement in excess of his reservation point. If the negotiator reveals
his reservation point too quickly, the opponent has no incentive to offer anything more
than the reservation price. Therefore, the competitive negotiator carefully hides not
61. Competitive negotiators characteristically have high aspiration levels; they expect a higher outcome for their
clients than would other negotiators. See C. KAR.RASs, supra note 8, at 17-18; see also L. FOURAKER & S. SIEGEL, supra
note 19, at 90-95.
62. See, e.g., C. KARRAss, supra note 8, at 18; Harnett, Cummings & Hamner, supra note 19, at 342.
63. See G. BE,. w& B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 529; D. PRUrrr, supra note 19, at 26; S. SIEGEL & L. FoURAKER,
supra note 59, at 67.
64. For example, a labor negotiator might include in her opening position a demand for a better pension plan. In
reality, the union may not be concerned about a better pension plan, but instead may intend to drop this demand in
exchange for wage concessions from the employer.
65. The false demand strategy can fail if the opponent agrees to concede to the false demand and psychologically
expects reciprocation.
66. If an initial demand is too high to be regarded as credible or reasonable, then at best it will have no effect and
at worst it may prevent successful negotiations. See G. BELLow & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 529. An outrageously
high demand may be dismissed by opposing counsel and have no effect on her evaluation of the case. It may cause
opposing counsel to resort to threats or to begin to prepare for trial in anticipation of deadlock. Excessive demands also
suggest to opposing counsel that the negotiating attorney does not understand the value of the case. This inferred attribution
of inexperience or incompetence might raise opposing counsel's expectations and result in her becoming a "tough"
opponent. See S. SIEGEL & L. FOURAKER, supra note 59, at 93.
67. Experiments conducted by Professor Raiffa of the Harvard Business School demonstrate that once two offers
are on the table, the best predict;on of the final agreement is the midpoint between the opening bids. H. RAIFFA, THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 48 t1982).
68. See generally G. BELLow & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 512, 528; D. PRUIT, supra note 19, at 172, 196;
Deutsch, supra note 34, at 137; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 79-83; Pruitt & Lewis, The Psychology of Integrative
Bargaining, in NEGOTIATION: SOCIAL-PSvCHOLOGCAL PERSPECnvES 175-76 (D. Druckman ed. 1977).
69. See, e.g., H. RAIFFA, supra note 67, at 84-85. This limit has also been referred to as a "'minimum disposition,"
G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 487, and as a "minimum necessary share," D. PRuIrr, supra note 19, at
47.
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only his reservation point, but also any information which would allow the
opponent to determine his true reservation point. For example, in a criminal case, the
prosecutor might conceal from the defense attorney information regarding her cas-
eload, her familiarity with the case, her own vacation plans, and the attitude of the
victim toward the case. 70 Conversely, the competitive negotiator selectively discloses
information which strengthens his case and which undermines the opponent's case.
The competifive negotiator should also pursue tactics that glean information about his
opponent's reservation price, his opponent's attitude toward the case, and specific
facts about the case. 7'
The competitive strategy of negotiations mandates that the party make as few
concessions 72 as possible. If a concession must be made, it should be as small as
possible. 73 The competitive negotiator makes concessions reluctantly, because con-
cessions may weakei one's position through both "position loss" and "image loss."
Position loss occurs because in most negotiations a norm exists against withdrawing
a concession. Further, an early concession results in an opportunity loss for something
that might have been extracted in exchange for the concession later in the negotiation
process. Image loss occurs because after a concession, the opponent perceives that the
negotiator is flexible; in the opponent's mind this may suggest that further concessions
can be obtained. 74 Obviously, however, concessions are generally an inevitable part
of the negotiating process. 75 Concessions made by a negotiator build an expectation
of reciprocity and lead to further concessions by the opponent which bring the parties
closer to agreement. 76 Granting concessions prevents premature deadlock and im-
passe and maintains goodwill with the adversary. This may be necessary to complete
the negotiations or to foster a continued cooperative venture in the future. When
possible, the competitive negotiator seeks to create the illusion in his opponent's eye
that he is making a concession without diminishing his own satisfaction.
70. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 513; see D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 25-26.
71. Professors Bellow and Moulton suggest a number of techniques that may be utilized by a negotiator to obtain
information from his opponent. The techniques described range from the deceptively simple yet effective method of direct
questioning, to the more subtle technique of suggesting third-party mediation in order to ascertain the opposing party's
commitment to her position. The opponent's firmness may also be evidenced by her reaction to the possibility of deadlock.
Professors Bellow and Moulton warn, however, that inevitable risks accompany these types of information bargaining.
The tactics delineated may create pressures on the instigator to disclose some of his own information or may increase the
level of suspicion and distrust between the negotiators. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 512-28.
72. "A concession is a change of offer in the supposed direction of the other party's interests that reduces the level
of benefit sought." D. Ptorrr, supra note 19, at 19.
73. See G. BELOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 543-45; C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 18-19; Chertkoff &
Conley, Opening Offer and Frequency of Concession as Bargaining Strategies, 7 J. PERsoNALrTY & Soc. PsycioLoGY 181,
184 (1967); Hamett, Cummings & Hamner, supra note 19, at 342-43.
74. See Pruitt, Indirect Communication and the Search for Agreement in Negotiation, 1 J. APPLIED SOC.
PsYcnoLOGY 205, 236-38 (1971).
75. A notable exception is Boulwarism, the strategy of making a reasonable opening offer and refusing to make
concessions. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 67, at 48. Lemuel Boulware, former vice-president of the General Electric
Company, started negotiations with unions by making what he considered to be a fair opening offer and then holding firm.
Id. Boulwarism has subsequently been held to be an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act. See
NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 762 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
76. See Pruitt, supra note 74, at 210-12.
[Vol. 46:41
1985] STRATEGY SELECTION IN LEGAL NEGOTIATION 51
This is done by either conceding on an issue the negotiator does not care about 77 or
appearing to make a concession without really making one. 78
The competitive negotiator obviously strives to force his opponent into making
as many and as large concessions as possible while he makes few concessions, small
in degree. To force concessions from his opponent, he employs both arguments and
threats. In negotiations, arguments are communications intended to persuade the
opponent to draw logical inferences from known data. 79 For example, a plaintiffs
attorney might describe a favorable eyewitness account of a collision and ask the
defense counsel to infer the probability that her client will be found liable. Arguments
should suggest to the opponent that her case is weaker than she previously thought
and, therefore, that she should make new concessions. A threat, on the other hand,
is a communication intended to inform the opponent that unless she agrees to a
settlement acceptable to the negotiator, the negotiator or his client will act to the
opponent's detriment. 80 For example, a union negotiator might threaten that the union
will strike if management refuses to make wage concessions.
The competitive negotiator not only uses offensive tactics to force concessions
from his opponent, but he also makes as few concessions as possible. The competitive
negotiator ignores both arguments and threats, believing that this is the best response.
When the negotiator must make a concession, the competitive strategist suggests that
the negotiator give the opponent a "positional commitment," a reason why he is not
conceding more.81 Without such a positional commitment, according to the compet-
itive strategist, the opponent will perceive the grant of a concession as a weakness and
will expect further concessions. The negotiator's resolve to concede nothing more can
be substantiated by linking the concession to a principle, 82 to the negotiator's personal
reputation, 83 or to a threat of ending negotiations. 84
To the extent that the success of a negotiation strategy is measured by the payoff
in a single negotiation involving the division of limited resources between two
77. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
78. For example, a prosecutor in plea bargaining might agree to dismiss one charge of a two-count indictment as
part of a plea bargain, realizing that dismissing one charge would not affect the length of the defendant's sentence because
the trial court judge would sentence concurrently on the two counts.
79. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 77; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 84. In the field of formal logic, an argument
has been defined as "a group of statements in which one, the conclusion, is claimed to follow from the others." J.
CORNMAN & K. LEHREsR, PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND ARGUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (1968).
80. See E. McGINNIES, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 431 (1970). See generally G. BELLow & B.
MOULTON, supra note 1, at 559-61; D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 77-78; T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 35-43
(1960); Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 85-88. To be effective, a threat must be credible, clearly stated, and prospective in
effect. See G. BELLow & B. MOULTON, supra note I, at 560-61; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 86-88. Credibility depends
on both the ability to carry out a threat and the inclination to do so. In assessing the credibility of a negotiator's threat,
the opponent should consider the past activity of the negotiator, as well as the proportionality of the threatened
consequences to the issue at stake in the negotiation. For example, it would not be credible for the prosecutor to threaten
a lengthy prison sentence for a defendant who has committed a minor offense and has no prior criminal record. Lowenthal,
supra note 5, at 86.
81. See D. PRUrr, supra tote 19, at 75-76.
82. For example, a prosecutor may refuse to reduce a felony to a misdemeanor because the conduct involved
personal violence.
83. A prosecutor might claim that if she further reduced a charge in plea bargaining, then she would not be able
to function effectively with law enforcement officers.
84. A defense attorney may tell the prosecutor that his client will not plead to any higher offense and that if his offer
is not acceptable to the prosecutor, then the case must proceed to trial.
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parties, 85 studies of simulated negotiations suggest that the competitive strategy yields
better results than other strategies for the negotiator.86 However, the competitive
strategy suffers severe disadvantages. The likelihood of impasse is much greater for
negotiators who employ the competitive strategy than for those who use other
approaches. 87 Competitive tactics engender tension and mistrust between the parties,
which can give the appearance that the parties are farther apart than they really are.
These negative attitudes may carry over into matters other than the current negotiation
and may make continuing relationships difficult.88
B. The Cooperative Strategy
A view of human nature different than that upon which the competitive strategy
is premised, with its emphasis on undermining the confidence of opposing counsel,
underlies most collaborative interaction. In everyday events, even when they are
deciding how to divide a limited resource between them, two negotiators often seek
to reach an agreement which is fair and equitable to both parties and seek to build an
interpersonal relationship based on trust. 89 This approach to negotiation can be
designated the cooperative strategy. 90 The cooperative negotiator initiates granting
concessions in order to create both a moral obligation to reciprocate and a relationship
built on trust that is conducive to achieving a fair agreement. 9'
The cooperative negotiator does not view making concessions as a necessity
resulting from a weak bargaining position or a loss of confidence in the value of her
case. Rather, she values concessions as an affirmative negotiating technique designed
to capitalize on the opponent's desire to reach a fair and just agreement and to
maintain an accommodative working relationship. Proponents of the cooperative
strategy believe that negotiators are motivated not only by individualistic or compet-
itive desires to maximize their own utilities, but also by collectivistic desires to reach
a fair solution. 92 Cooperative negotiators assert that the competitive strategy often
leads to resentment between the parties and a breakdown of negotiations. 93
85. This negotiation context has been labelled distributive bargaining or share bargaining. See supra notes 44-45
and accompanying text; see also infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
86. See C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 17-25; S. StEGm. & L. FouRArER, supra note 59, at 52; Harnett, Cummings
& Hamner, supra note 19, at 342-43.
87. See E. McGINNIEs, supra note 80, at 210; C. OSGOOD, supra note 36, at 75-76; G. WLuAzSs, supra note 3,
at 50-52.
88. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
89. In this context, trust is defined "as a belief that the other [person] is ready for coordination." D. PRurrr, supra
note 19, at 124.
90. See generally 0. BARTos, PROCESS AND OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS 44-47 (1974); D. Pxurr, supra note 19, at
91-135; G. WiUt.Mms, supra note 3, at 53-54, 75-76; Bartos, supra note 19, at 13-27. According to the cooperative
negotiation theorist, "[Tihe key to inducing conciliatory behavior is not coercion and intimidation but a set of moves that
encourage the other negotiator to feel competent and effective." Rubin, Negotiation: An Introduction to Some Issues and
Themes, 27 Am. BEHAVIORAL SCmrnsr 135, 141 (1983).
91. See G. Vut.uAmS, supra note 3, at 53; Bartos, supra note 19, at 13-15.
92. See Bartos, supra note 19, at 14-15. In 1961, Professor Homans, a sociologist, formulated the rule of
"distributive justice" which essentially provides that individuals will regard as fair, rewards that are proportional to the
recipient's contribution to society. 0. BARTos, supra note 90, at 30.
93. See G. WITtI.ASMs supra note 3, at 50-52; Bartos, supra note 19, at 26-27.
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According to Professor Otomar Bartos, an originator of the cooperative strategy,
the negotiator should begin negotiations not with a maximalist position, but rather
with a more moderate opening bid that is both favorable to him and barely acceptable
to the opponent. 94 Once two such opening bids are on the table, the negotiators should
determine the midpoint between the two opening bids and regard it as a fair and
equitable outcome. External facts, such as how large a responsive concession the
negotiator expects from the opponent, whether she is representing a tough constitu-
ency that would view large concessions unfavorably, and whether she is under a tight
time deadline and wants to expedite the process by making a large concession, affect
the size of the negotiator's first concession. According to Professor Bartos, the
negotiator should then expect the opponent to reciprocate with a concession of similar
size so that the midpoint between the parties' positions remains the same as it was
after the realistic opening bids were made. 95 The concessions by the parties are fair,
according to Bartos, as long as the parties do not need to revise their initial
expectations about the substance of the agreement. 96
The term cooperative strategy embraces a larger variety of negotiation tactics
than Bartos' detailed model. Cooperative strategies include any strategies that aim to
develop trust between the parties and that focus on the expectation that the opponent
will match concessions ungrudgingly. 97 Endemic to all cooperative strategies is the
question of how the negotiator should respond if the opponent does not match her
concessions and does not reciprocate her goodwill. The major weakness of the
cooperative approach is its vulnerability to exploitation by the competitive negotia-
tor. 98 The cooperative negotiator is severely disadvantaged if her opponent fails to
reciprocate her concessions. 99 Cooperative negotiation theorists suggest a variety of
responses when concessions are not matched. Professor Bartos recommends that the
negotiator "stop making further concessions until the opponent catches up."' 00
94. See Bartos, supra note 19, at 19-20, 24.
95. See id. at 21.
96. Id. at 22.
97. See D. Ptorrr, supra note 19, at 91-135; G. WILUAIMS, supra note 3, at 53-54.
98. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 92-93; G. WnLLtis, supra note 3, at 53-54.
99. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text for a complete description of how the cooperative negotiator
fares poorly when paired against a competitive negotiator, see also G. BEt1ow & B. MouLTO, , supra note 1, at 545-48;
E. MCGtNNES, supra note 80, at 417-18, 423-24; D. Pturrr, supra note 19, at 102-10; H. RAIFFA, supra note 67, at
123-26.
100. Bartos, supra note 19, at 23. Professor Osgood recommends a more elaborate approach for encouraging trust
and cooperation in an aggravated conflict situation known as Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction, or simply
GRIT. See C. OsooD, supra note 36, at 85-134. Osgood's GRIT approach has been organized into ten separate steps
by Professor Lindskold:
I. The series of actions must be announced ahead of time as an effort to reduce tension.
2. Each action should be labelled as part of this series.
3. The initially announced timetable must be observed.
4. The target should be invited to reciprocate each action.
5. The series of actions must be continued for a period of time, even if there is no reciprocation.
6. The actions should be clear-cut and susceptible to verification.
7. The strategist must retain his or her capacity to retaliate should the other become more
competitive during this campaign.
8. The strategist should retaliate if the other becomes competitive.
9. The actions should be of various kinds, so that all they have in common is their cooperative
nature.
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Because of its vulnerability to exploitation, the cooperative theory may not
initially appear to be a viable alternative to the competitive strategy. As mentioned
previously, in tightly controlled experiments with simulated negotiations, the com-
petitive strategy generally produces better results. However, in actual practice, the
competitive approach results in more impasses and greater distrust between the
parties. '0' Furthermore, most people tend to be cooperative in orientation and trusting
of others. Professor Williams found that sixty-five percent of the attorneys he
surveyed used a cooperative approach. ' 0 2 This, of course, means that in a majority of
cases the cooperative negotiator will not be exploited by her opponent, because the
opponent also uses a cooperative approach. Most cooperative negotiators probably
would not feel comfortable using the competitive negotiators' aggressive tactics,
which are designed to undermine the opponent and his case. Nor would they relish
living and working in the mistrustful milieu which may result from the use of the
competitive strategy.
C. The Integrative Strategy
Both the competitive and cooperative strategies focus on the opposing positions
of the negotiators--each negotiator attempts to achieve as many concessions from the
other as possible. These concessions move the negotiations closer to an outcome
favorable to the negotiator; however, each concession diminishes the opponent's
satisfaction with the potential agreement. Integrative bargaining, on the other hand,
attempts to reconcile the parties' interests and thus provides high benefits to both. 0 3
Integrative bargaining is usually associated with a situation in which the parties'
interests are not directly opposed and the benefit of one widget for one party does not
necessarily result in the loss of one widget for the opponent. t4 Instead, the parties use
a problem-solving approach to invent a solution which satisfies the interests of both
parties.
Integrative bargaining recently has received widespread attention as the result of
the publication of Professors Roger Fisher and William Ury's popular text, Getting
to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In.l0 5 Professors Fisher and Ury's
negotiation strategy is largely based on integrative bargaining theory, although it goes
10. The other should be rewarded for cooperating, the level of reward being graduated to the other's
level of cooperation.
Lindskold, Trust Development, the GRIT Proposal, and the Effects of Conciliatory Acts on Conflict and Cooperation, 85
PSYCHOLOGICAL BUL  772, 775-77 (1978).
101. See C. OSGOOD, supra note 36, at 69-71; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 50-52.
102. See G.WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 18. It is important to remember, however, that Professor Williams uses the
descriptive term "cooperative" in a somewhat different manner than it is used here. See supra notes 50-53 and
accompanying text.
103. See R. FiSHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 10-11; D. PRuIrr, supra note 19, at 137-200; G. WIL.±.s, supra
note 3, at 76-77.
104. See R. WALTON & R. McKEs]E, supra note 34, at 126-37; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 73-74.
105. R. FtstHER & W. URY, supra note 3.
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beyond integrative theory in important ways. 06 The authors call their strategy
principled negotiation 07 and identify four basic points to this approach:
People: Separate the people from the problem.
Interests: Focus on interests, not positions.
Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do.
Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard. 08
The first point distinguishes integrative bargaining from both cooperative bar-
gaining and competitive bargaining, according to Professors Fisher and Ury. ' 09 The
competitive bargainer believes that his relationship with the opponent is important,
because he seeks to change the opponent's position through sheer willpower. 10 The
cooperative negotiator builds trust in order to reach a fair agreement. In contrast,
Professors Fisher and Ury's principled negotiator attempts to separate the interper-
sonal relationship between the negotiators from the ierits of the problem or con-
flict."'
Professors Fisher and Ury's second and third points are the standard components
of integrative bargaining theory. The negotiation dance of concession matching or
positioning, which is a part of both competitive and cooperative behavior, often
obscures the parties' real interests. "1 2 A major component of integrative bargaining is
the free exchange of information between the negotiators so that each party's motives,
goals, and values are understood and appreciated."13
Integrative bargaining attempts to locate a solution that satisfies both parties'
respective interests. 14 Professor Dean Pruitt, a social psychologist, identifies several
types of integrative agreements. The most dramatic integrative solution emerges when
the parties "brainstorm" and develop a new option that satisfies the significant needs
of both parties. "5 The second type of integrative bargaining is often referred to as
"logrolling." 116 In logrolling, each negotiator agrees to make concessions on some
issues while his counterpart concedes on other issues; the agreement reconciles the
parties' interests to the extent that the parties have different priorities on the issues.
For example, a plea bargaining agreement might provide that the defendant will plead
guilty to a felony, and the prosecutor will recommend that the defendant receive
106. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
107. R. Ftstts & W. URY, supra note 3. at xii. Professors Fisher and Ury reject the argument that principled
negotiation cannot be applied to situations where the interests of the parties conflict. Id. at xiii. They believe principled
negotiation is an all-purpose strategy. Id.; see also infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
108. R. Fisttrn & W. URY, supra note 3, at II.
109. Id. at 8-9, 11, 20-21.
110. Id. at 6.
Ill. Id at II.
112. Id. at II, 41-57. Professors Fisher and Ury offer the 1978 peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt as an
example. Egypt insisted that Israel return the entire Sinai peninsula, which had been occupied by Israel since the 1967
Six Day War, to Egyptian sovereignty. Israel insisted upon keeping portions of the Sinai so that Egyptian tanks would
.not be poised on Israel's border. Neither side could accept the results of repeated attempts to divide the territory. At the
Camp David negotiations, the parties agreed to return the entire Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, but also agreed to
demilitarize major portions of it, thus satisfying the underlying interests of both parties. Id. at 42-43.
113. See id. at 45-54; see also D. PRutrrr. supra note 19, at 170-75.
114. See R. FisttRt & W. URY, supra note 3. at 58-83, D. Pirurrr, supra note 19, at 141-62.
115. See R. Fistii & W. URY, supra note 3, at 64-79; D. PRturrr, supra note 19, at 154-62.
116. D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 153-54.
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probation. " 7 Defendants are often most concerned with the possibility of imprison-
ment; the prosecutor, in a particular case, may care more about securing a felony
conviction than she does about the defendant's sentence.
Another form of integrative bargaining is described by Professor Pruitt as "cost
cutting.""I8 A negotiator, in order to reach an agreement, may find ways to diminish
the tangible or intangible costs to the opponent when the opponent accepts an
agreement that satisfies the negotiator. For example, a management attorney who
agrees to the wage demands of a certain type of worker might be concerned that in
the future the union will expect similarly generous agreements for other workers. The
union negotiator may reassure management that she understands that this wage
agreement for certain employees stems from special circumstances, such as historical
inequities, and that similar wage concessions should not be expected for other
employees. 119
Several procedures facilitate reaching an integrative agreement. The free ex-
change of information and brainstorming efforts to invent options for mutual gains
were discussed previously. In addition, the possibility of logrolling suggests that
disputed issues should be considered simultaneously rather than sequentially. ' 20 The
negotiator should also develop a set of goals and other requirements in order to
generate and screen alternative proposals. ' 2' To the extent that the parties exchange
negotiating proposals, the integrative negotiator should try to incorporate into his
proposal some element of an opponent's previously suggested solution. ' 22 Finally, the
negotiator should continually alter his own proposal incrementally so he only
gradually reduces the level of benefit to be realized by his client. This behavior is
referred to by Professor Pruitt as "heuristic trial and error." 23
Traditional integrative bargaining strategy does not have universal applicabil-
ity. 124 The strategy is utilized most easily when the parties share a problem-solving
orientation, and either an identifiable mutual gain option is available or multiple
issues which can be traded off against one another exist. 125 It is less useful when the
parties disagree on only a single issue and the parties' interests are inherently
117. See infra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
118. D. Pxurrr, supra note 19, at 142-48.
119. The last form of integrative bargaining identified by Professor Pruitt is "'compensation." Id. at 148-53. The
opponent is indemnified for the costs he experiences in agreeing to an outcome acceptable to the negotiator. Compensation
is therefore closely related to logrolling. Although with logrolling an opponent is "compensated" by a concession on
another issue in dispute between the parties, Professor Pruitt's compensation is a broader concept.
120. D. Psurrr, supra note 19, at 165-67.
121. Professor Pruitt refers to these explicitly articulated goals as "a search model." Id. at 167.
122. Id. at 169.
123. Id. at 175.
124. See G. WILLIAsS, supra note 3, at 76-77.
125. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 67, at 131.
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opposed. Examples of situations that present direct conflicts include personal injury
litigation 26 and plea bargaining. 127
Professors Fisher and Ury urge the "principled negotiator" to insist upon a result
based on objective criteria when the parties' interests seem to directly conflict and no
mutually advantageous solution appears to be available.' 28 In this situation, they
recommend the following steps:
I. Frame each issue as a joint search for objective criteria.
2. Reason and be open to reason as to which standards are most appropriate and
how they should be applied.
3. Never yield to pressure, only to principle. 29
By stressing the desirability of reaching a fair decision, Professors Fisher and
Ury appear to be borrowing from the principles of the cooperative strategists,
especially from Professor Otomar Bartos. ' 30 With this addition to traditional integra-
tive bargaining, Professors Fisher and Ury claim to have found an "all-purpose
strategy"' 3' that can be used in any negotiation regardless of the number of issues,
the nature of the issues, or the orientation of the opposing party.
D. The Strategic Choice Model
The three negotiation strategies outlined above are not mutually exclusive;
frequently a negotiator will use more than one strategy in a single negotiation. 32
Some issues in a negotiation may lend themselves to an integrative approach, while
others must be resolved through competitive or cooperative bargaining. Furthermore,
most negotiations that begin with competitive approaches will culminate prior to
agreement with either cooperative or integrative bargaining. 33 Social psychologist
Professor Dean Pruitt, in his strategic choice model of negotiation, recognizes that
various negotiation strategies will be used in the same negotiation. 134 The strategic
choice model suggests that the negotiator must choose between engaging in compet-
itive behavior, making a unilateral concession, and suggesting an integrative proposal
at every point in the negotiation process. These alternative tactics correspond closely
with the competitive, cooperative, and integrative strategies previously outlined.
126. Even in personal injury litigation, Professor Williams points out, some opportunities for mutual gain exist. See
G. Wn±L js, supra note 3, at 76-77. Both parties benefit from tort settlements because they avoid incurring attorneys'
fees and other costs associated with trial. Damages in personal injury actions are increasingly being paid in "structured
settlements" over a period of time; such settlements may meet the interests of both parties. See Krause, Structured
Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A. J. 1527 (1980); see also infra note 225 and accompanying text.
127. Once again, some opportunity for mutual gain may be present in the plea bargaining scenario. The prosecutor
may be most concerned with her conviction record and the defendant may be most concerned with the length of
incarceration. Thus, a conviction with a short sentence would serve both parties' interests. See infra notes 283-86 and
accompanying text.
128. R. FistimR & W. URY, supra note 3, at 11, 84-98.
129. Id. at 91.
130. See 0. BArros, supra note 90, at 298-302; Bartos, supra note 19, at 24.
131. R. FisHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at xiii.
132. See Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 74-75; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 759 n.10.
133. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text; see also D. Purrr, supra note 19, at 131-35.
134. D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 15; see also Pruitt, supra note 20, at 167.
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Professor Pruitt further suggests that negotiations frequently will progress from
a competitive stage to what he refers to as a coordinative stage. 135 During the
competitive stage, the negotiator tries to persuade the opponent to move toward the
negotiator's position and to convince the opponent that the negotiator's own position
is firm. 136 Eventually, however, if the parties are to agree, they must engage in either
cooperative or integrative bargaining.137 The competitive antagonism between the
parties diminishes as each negotiator's own goals and expectations are tempered by
realism; trust is engendered as the negotiators recognize that the opponent's expec-
tations have also been lowered. At this point, the parties are psychologically ready to
trade concessions or engage in problem-solving in order to resolve the conflict.
Often, competitive behavior and cooperative behavior alternate within a single
negotiation or even occur simultaneously; different issues will be at varying stages of
resolution, and agreements resulting from cooperative or integrative bargaining will
often produce new issues to be resolved by the parties. Negotiators, however, cannot
easily shift between competitive tactics and cooperative or integrative tactics in all
instances. Successful competitive tactics, which attack the opponent and his case,
jeopardize the positive working relationships necessary for the cooperative and
integrative strategies.138 The combination of competitive strategies and cooperative or
integrative strategies will typically occur only at different phases of a negotiation
process 39 or on easily separable and distinct issues.
III. FACTORS SUGGESTING THE OPTIMAL NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
Proponents of each negotiation theory outlined above sometimes promise that
their strategy will always yield the best result. ' 40 However, social psychologists, and
135. D. Pumrrr, supra note 19, at 131-35. See generally C. STEVENS, STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE BARGANLNG
NEGOrI'TrON 11 (1963).
136. Professor Pruitt identifies five purposes for the competitive stage:
1. Posturing before constituents to make it seem that the bargainer is working vigorously on their
behalf. This image should make it easier for the bargainer later to recommend a coordinative
approach without being labeled as soft or disloyal by his or her constituents.
2. Clarifying one's own goals and priorities.
3. Assessing how far the other can be pushed into making concessions. Until such a test has been
made, at least one of the parties is likely to be unwilling to conclude an agreement because of
the belief that more can be achieved through competitive posturing.
4. Demonstrating firmness with respect to one's major goals. It is generally believed that the other
party will remain in a competitive stance until the bargainer seems unlikely to make further
unilateral concessions. Hence bargainers must establish an image of firmness before switching
to coordinative behavior.
5. Narrowing the range of possible outcomes to the point where a large perceived divergence of
interest no longer exists.
D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 135.
137. Id. at 132-34.
138. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
140. For example, Professors Fisher and Ury regard their principled negotiation, based primarily upon an integrative
strategy, as an all-purpose strategy. R. FisaRs & W. URY, supra note 3, at xiii. Professors Fisher & Ury claim that
[plrincipled negotiation can be used whether there is one issue or several; two parties or many; whether there
is a prescribed ritual, as in collective bargaining, or an impromptu free-for-all, as in talking with hijackers. The
method applies whether the other side is more experienced or less, a hard bargainer or a friendly one.
Id. Professor Fisher's advocacy of principled negotiation has mellowed somewhat. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 120.
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recently a few legal negotiation theorists, more realistically have suggested that the
choice of the appropriate bargaining strategy depends on a number of factors.1 41
Analytically, the choice of an effective negotiating strategy is a two-step process.
First, the negotiator should decide whether the competitive strategy or one of the
noncompetitive strategies, either the cooperative or the integrative strategy, is more
likely to be advantageous. If the initial analysis suggests a noncompetitive strategy,
the negotiator must elect either the cooperative or the integrative strategy. Obviously,
the sequence of these two decisions may affect the choice of strategy in some cases.
Proponents of integrative bargaining claim that the negotiator should first consider
whether opportunities for integrative solutions exist;142 only if such opportunities do
not exist should the negotiator consider the choice between the competitive and
cooperative strategies. ' 4 3 It is argued here, however, that the negotiator should first
consider the opponent's negotiating strategy before evaluating other determinative
factors. If the opponent pursues a competitive strategy, then both the integrative and
cooperative strategies may leave the negotiator vulnerable to exploitation. Accord-
ingly, the negotiator should first decide whether the opponent has the requisite attitude
necessary for the noncompetitive strategies to be successful: trust, for the cooperative
strategy, or problem-solving orientation, for integrative bargaining.
It is important to remember that the choice of a negotiation strategy is a decision
to be made jointly by the attorney and the client. Even though the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct assign decisions regarding "legal tactical issues" and the
"means of representation" to the attorney, t44 the client "has a right to consult with
the lawyer about the means to be used in pursuing those objectives."'' 45 Further, the
attorney is bound by "a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of
a matter."1 46 Thus, the original offer or demand in a negotiation and all subsequent
concessions must be approved by the client. Optimally, this division of authority
between the attorney and the client suggests that the attorney should discuss possible
negotiation strategies with the client and receive input from her before and during the
negotiation. 147
141. See generally D. PRur, supra note 19, at 30-45, 84-96, 107-33, 195-200 for examples of social
psychologists who espouse this view. Legal negotiation theorists who agree include Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 92-112,
and Menkel-Meadow who also criticizes the earlier negotiation literature and comments: "What is astounding about the
conventional literature on tactics and strategies is the assumption of universal applicability." Menkel-Meadow, supra note
11, at 776.
142. See, e.g., R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 59-83.
143. Professors Fisher and Ury recognize that the negotiator "will almost always face the harsh reality of interests
that conflict." Id. at 84. In these instances, Professors Fisher and Ury recommend the use of "objective criteria," id. at
84, which essentially mirrors the cooperative strategy, see supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text. Finally, if the
opponent continues to use competitive tactics, Professors Fisher and Ury indicate that the negotiator may be forced to
present a "take it or leave it" choice to the opponent, R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 147, or walk away from
the negotiations, see id. at 95-96. To summarize, Professors Fisher and Ury's model, in contrast to the model presented
here, suggests that the negotiator begin with an integrative strategy, change to the cooperative strategy if the integrative
strategy falls, and, finally, switch to the competitive strategy if the cooperative strategy fails.
144. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuct Rule 1.2 comment (1983).
145. Id.
146. Id. Rule 1.2(a). For an excellent analysis of why clients should make these decisions, see D. RoSEm-mAL,
LAwYER AN CuLrt'r WHo's IN CHARGE? 2, 13-16 (1974).
147. See generally D. BmDR & S. PiucE, supra note 5, at 135-76.
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A. Choosing Between a Competitive and a Noncompetitive Strategy
1. The Opponent's Negotiation Strategy
The single most important factor to consider in choosing between a competitive
and noncompetitive strategy is the opponent's likely negotiating strategy. To be
successful, the cooperative and integrative approaches require that both the negotiator
and her opponent adopt the same strategy. 148 Thus, a negotiator who is paired against
a competitive opponent should not adopt a cooperative strategy, because her coop-
erative tactics will be exploited. 149 Instead of reciprocating the cooperative
148. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (cooperative strategy); G. WiLuAms supra note 3, at 53-54; see
also D. PRsuiT, supra note 19, at 182-92 (integrative theory).
Proponents of the cooperative theory, see C. OsoOoD, supra note 36; Bartos, supra note 19, and proponents of the
integrative theory, see generally R. FtSHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at xiii, 112-13, claim their theories will work even
against a competitive negotiator. However, if the opposing negotiator refuses to match the cooperative or integrative
approach, these strategists essentially prescribe a return to a competitive strategy. Professors Fisher and Ury admit:
If the other side truly will not budge and will not advance a persuasive basis for their position, then there
is no further negotiation. You now have a choice like the one you face when you walk into a store which has
a fixed, nonnegotiable price on what you want to buy. You can take it or leave it.
Id. at 95.
149. The harm that is inflicted on the cooperative negotiator when negotiating with a competitive opponent is
demonstrated by the results in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. For descriptions of variations on this experimental game,
see G. BELLow & B. MOuLTO N, supra note I, at 475-76; E. McGINN[ s, supra note 80, at 417-18, 423-24; D. PRturr,
supra note 19, at 102-10; H. RAIFFA supra note 67, at 123-26. In its original form, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game can
be summarized as follows:
[Two suspects have been taken into custody by the police. They are interviewed separately by the district
attorney, who tries to convince each one to turn state's evidence in order to obtain a lighter sentence. Both
prisoners know that if neither confesses the worst that will happen to them is a light sentence for vagrancy. If
one confesses and the other does not, the one who confesses will be given lenient treatment while the one who
refuses to confess will have the book thrown at him. On the other hand, if both confess, then both will be
punished with moderate rather than severe sentences. Each prisoner thus has two strategies--to confess or not
to confess-and different payoffs, or consequences, are associated with each course of action.
Suppose that the payoff matrix shown [in the figure below] obtains for the parties to this dilemma. The
dilemma for each suspect is obvious. If neither knows what choice the other has made, and if each chooses the
alternative most advantageous to himself with no consideration for the other, then both will receive sentences
of eight years. A moment's consideration will reveal why this is so. The rules of the game, it should be recalled,
specify the outcome for each combination of choices. The strategy elected by A determines the row in which








Does not confess Confesses
l year for A; 20 years for A;
I year for B 6 months for B
6 months for A; 8 years for A;
20 years for B 8 years for B
Figure: Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma (Adapted from Brown 1965)
From A's point of view, the verbal problem-solving process probably goes something like this: "If I do
not confess, I may get only one year. But if B turns state's evidence, then I will get twenty years. On the other
hand, if I confess, I may get only six months, and the worst I can get is eight years. I had better confess and
avoid the possibility of a twenty-year sentence." If B reasons the same way, then the outcome is a moderate
penalty for both.
If A and B can trust one another, then each is better off not confessing, since the maximum sentence that
each can receive is one year. In the absence of mutual trust, the best they can achieve is a compromise eight-year
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negotiator's concessions, the competitive opponent will interpret the concessions as
a sign of weakness and will grant fewer concessions. The cooperative negotiator loses
both position and image in this situation' 50 and moves no closer to agreement. The
cooperative strategy succeeds only if the opponent reciprocates and makes conces-
sions. 151 Although the integrative strategy is somewhat less vulnerable to exploitation
by a competitive negotiator than the cooperative approach, it also requires an
exchange of information and a responsiveness to the other negotiator's interests and
needs; these tactics may be exploited by the competitive negotiator who will refuse
to exchange information and respond to the adversary's needs. '
52
A noncompetitive strategy thus is contraindicated if the opponent pursues a
competitive strategy 153 and the negotiator cannot induce him to change to a noncom-
petitive strategy. 154 If the opponent pursues a noncompetitive strategy, the negotiator
can choose between competitive and noncompetitive strategies on the basis of other
factors suggested below.' 55 In the rare instances in which the negotiator is not
concerned about the parties' continuing relationship and the negotiator has a feasible
alternative if negotiations break down, the competitive strategy may be used suc-
cessfully to exploit an unskilled noncompetitive negotiator.' 5 6 Of course, the at-
tempted use of a competitive strategy to exploit a noncompetitive negotiator-opponent
may cause an impasse, particularly when the noncompetitive negotiator senses this
sentence. They have then arrived at what can be called a noncooperative equilibrium point (Shubik, 1964). If
the suspects were to cooperate, in effect, to form a coalition against the prosecutor, then they could achieve a
better mutual outcome by escaping with one-year sentences. Effectively, what each has done is to envision the
worst thing that could happen to him for either confessing or not confessing. He then selects the lesser of these
two evils, thus fixing his strategy. In A's case, this means selection of the row, and in B's case selection of the
column, corresponding to "confess."
E. McGtNNIES, supra note 80. at 417-18.
A prisoner's decision to confess is obviously a decision to cooperate with the other prisoner. If both prisoners
cooperate, their interests are well served. However, if one makes the cooperative choice and the other the competitive
choice, the competitor fares very well while the cooperator is severely injured. See Donohue, Analyzing Negotiation
Tactics: Derelopment of a Negotiation Interact System, 7 Hut. Coxt. RESEARCH 273, 285 (1981) ('Individuals using
tactics with greater attacking power relative to their opponents were more successful negotiators.").
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game is used by game theorists as an experimental tool to study negotiation. Game theory
is a mathematical discipline used to study joint decisionmaking in conflict situations. See generallv A. RAPOPORT,
Two-PFRSON GAME THEORY: THE EsSENrtAL IDEAS (1966). The participants in game theory experiments, while attempting
to maximize their own outcomes, must take into account the actions of other participants-they aspire to different goals
and their actions affect, in part, the participants' joint outcome. See G. BEu.ow & B. MouLToN. supra note I. at 469-70.
For a discussion of the limitations of game theory in understanding negotiations in the real world, see H. RAIFFA. supra
note 67, at 1-6.
150. See supra text accompanying note 74.
151. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 170-75.
152. See Prtitt, supra note 20, at 168. See generally R. FisnER & W. URY. supra note 3. at 41-57; D. PRUtrr. supra
note 19, at 166-67. Professor Menkel-Meadow, an advocate of the problem-solving approach, admits that "totally
uninhibited information sharing may be . . . dysfunctional. ... Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1 1, at 822.
153. See C. OSGOOD, supra note 36, at 75-84; D. PRurrr, supra note 19. at 116-18; Chertkoff & Esser, A Review
of Experiments in Explicit Bargaining, 12 J. ExPRtErrAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 464, 480-82 (1976); Wall, Operantly
Conditioning a Negotiator's Concession Making, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 431. 431-40 (1977).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100 for the steps a cooperative negotiator should take when the opponent
does not reciprocate with concessions. See generally R. FiSHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 112-18 (integrative strategy).
155. See infra notes 163-214 and accompanying text.
156. The unskilled cooperative negotiator makes concessions in order to build trust and to establish the expectation
of reciprocal concessions, see supra text accompanying notes 90-91, but is sufficiently naive that he does not terminate
his pattern of giving unilateral concessions when the opponent fails to reciprocate, see supra text accompanying notes
98-100.
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exploitation and responds defensively. 157 If a negotiator shapes her own strategy
around the opponent's negotiating strategy, she must determine the nature of her
opponent's strategy or what it will be in the future. Predictions about which strategy
an opponent will employ can be gleaned from at least four sources:
(1) The Opponent's Early Strategy in the Instant Negotiation. 58
The opponent's early moves in a negotiation, such as his opening bid and subsequent
concessions, often indicate whether he is using a competitive strategy. The display of
a combative personal style as the bargaining begins and the use of threats are also
indicators of this strategy.
(2) The Opponent's Strategy in Past Negotiations. 59
The opponent's past history of negotiation tactics, either with the negotiator personally
or with others, may suggest the approach the opponent is likely to employ in the
instant negotiation. Knowledge about the opponent's personality, whether he is
argumentative or amiable, may also be a strategy indicator. t6
(3) The Strategy of Similarly Situated Negotiators.
The negotiator may have no information about her specific opponent, but may have
considerable information about the past performance of similarly situated negotiators.
All claims adjusters for a particular insurance company may tend to use a competitive
strategy; all labor lawyers representing a vocal union may be competitive in the
opening rounds; most prosecutors working with a busy office may be cooperative.' 6'
(4) The Negotiator's Favored Strategy if She Were in the Opponent's Position. 62
A negotiator may be able to anticipate the opponent's strategy by placing herself in the
opponent's position and determining what strategy she would use if confronted with
the pressures and incentives facing the opponent.
2. Relative Bargaining Power
The second factor the negotiator should consider in choosing a negotiation
strategy is the relative power of the negotiator and the opponent. Power can be defined
as the capacity to influence the opponent. 163 The critical factor in negotiations is not
power itself, but rather the opponent's perception of power. '64 A negotiator's power
157. See G. VILLIsAS, supra note 3, at 51-52. Professor Williams found that settlement impasse resulted in twice
as many cases when cooperative negotiators deemed ineffective by their colleagues were involved than when competitive
negotiators deemed ineffective by their colleagues were involved. Id. at 51.
158. See D. Pgxurr, supra note 19, at 125. Observation of the opponent's early strategic moves does not reveal, of
course, whether the opponent will continue to use the same strategy or will switch to another strategy. See supra text
accompanying notes 132-39. For example, some of the negotiation strategies suggested later in this article include a
transition from an initially competitive strategy to a noncompetitive strategy. See infra text accompanying notes 290-305
(defense attorney's strategy in plea bargaining).
An opponent's early cooperative moves which involve risks or costs to the opponent are more likely than less risky
moves to be true indicators of a cooperative strategy. For example, by sharing information the opponent risks possible
detrimental use of that information by the negotiator. This signals the opponent's intention to adopt a cooperative
approach. D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 125. Similarly, the opponent's initial moves should be regarded as less reliable
indications of a cooperative approach if there are other plausible reasons for his moves or if the concessions are attributable
to weakness. Id. at 126.
159. See Lowenthal, supra note 5, at I1.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 199-208.
161. See infra notes 263, 273-74 and accompanying text.
162. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 40-41, 128-29.
163. See id. at 87; see also S. BACHARACH & E. LAwLER, BARGAINING: POWER, TACnCS, AND OuOTcms 37-40 (1981);
Tjosvold & Okun, Effects of Unequal Power on Cooperation in Conflict, 44 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 239, 239-42 (1979).
164. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 87-88.
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results from the negative consequences she can inflict on an opponent if an agreement
is not reached and from the benefits that the negotiator can bestow on an opponent if
a settlement is achieved.
The extent of a negotiator's power over an opponent depends largely on the
alternatives available to the opponent if an agreement is not reached. 65 If not reaching
an agreement produces severe consequences for the opponent, then the negotiator has
great leverage to dictate the terms of an agreement. 166 Conversely, if the opponent has
other viable options if attempts at an agreement fail, a negotiator has relatively little
power. In the litigation context, a negotiator's power is therefore dependent on both
the likely outcome at trial and the opponent's costs of proceeding through trial. 167 In
addition, the ability to inflict negative consequences or to bestow benefits on the
opponent, other than those arising directly from the agreement or the failure to reach
an agreement, increases a negotiator's power. 168 Finally, the relative power of the
negotiators is affected not only by the alternatives available to the parties, but also by
the parties' respective commitment to the issues at stake. 169 If one negotiator values
an outcome on a particular issue very highly, then his power or ability to influence
the outcome of negotiations on that issue increases.
When a negotiator's power is greater than that of her opponent, she may choose
either a competitive or a noncompetitive strategy. A negotiator with a viable
alternative to a negotiated agreement is exposed to minimal risk if she chooses the
competitive strategy, despite the increased risk of settlement impasse. In addition,
threats made by a powerful negotiator who uses a competitive strategy will be
165. See S. BACHARACIt & E. LAwLER, supra note 163, at 60-62; R. Ftsttas & W. URY, supra note 3, at 106-08.
Professors Fisher and Ury use the phrase "Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement" or "BATNA" to identify the
"standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured." Id. at 104; see also Fisher, Negotiating Power:
Getting atd Using Influence, 27 A'. BEHAVIORAL ScjrErlsr 149, 156-57 (1983).
166. Professors Fisher and Ury note that power in negotiations often has little to do with wealth and power in other
contexts.
Consider a wealthy tourist who wants to buy a small brass pot for a modest price from a vendor at the Bombay
railroad station. The vendor may be poor, but he is likely to know the market. If he does not sell the pot to this
tourist, he can sell it to another. From his experience he can estimate when and for how much he could sell it
to someone else. The tourist may be wealthy and "powerful," but in this negotiation he will be weak indeed
unless he knows approximately how much it would cost and how difficult it would be to find a comparable pot
elsewhere. He is almost certain either to miss his chance to buy such a pot or to pay too high a price. The tourist's
wealth in no way strengthens his negotiating power. If apparent, it weakens his ability to buy the pot at a low
price. In order to convert that wealth into negotiating power, the tourist would have to apply it to learn about
the price at which he could buy an equally or more attractive brass pot somewhere else.
R. Ftsits & W. URY, supra note 3, at 106-07 (emphasis in original).
167. One commentator described negotiated settlements in civil cases in this manner:
Litigants settle out of court for only one reason: each thinks he obtains through the settlement agreement an
outcome at least as good as his estimated outcome in court. Therefore, all settlement negotiations proceed within
the confines of the parties' anticipations of the result of the contemplated lawsuit. Each party's bargaining limit
is determined by his evaluation of the probable dollar outcome in court, adjusted for the probable dollar costs
of litigation and settlement.
Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REv. 67. 70-71 (1969).
168. For example, in plea bargaining the prosecutor may charge the defendant with other, more serious crimes if the
defendant refuses to enter a guilty plea. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 377-80 (1982); Bordenkircher v.
Hayes. 434 U.S. 357, 360-65 (1978).
169. See S. BACHARACH & E. LAwtLER, supra note 163, at 61-63. As used in this context, commitment means the
value of the outcome to the negotiator or his "motivational investment." Id. at 62. It is not used in the same sense as
commitment tactic, a part of the competitive strategy. See supra text accompanying notes 8 1-84.
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perceived as more credible and will more likely lead to concessions by an opponent
than would threats by a weaker negotiator. 70
The less powerful negotiator has two options available: (1) she can attempt to
increase her own power and decrease that of her opponent, or (2) she can pursue a
noncompetitive strategy. 171 The negotiator may be able to alter the relative distribu-
tion of power within a negotiation; for example, she may convince the opponent to
reconsider the attractiveness of the opponent's "best alternative to a negotiated
agreement." If a negotiator succeeds in reducing her opponent's power advantage,
any negotiation strategy will more likely lead to a favorable outcome because the
opponent will be more likely to make concessions.
Noncompetitive strategies are more effective than competitive strategies for
low-power negotiators; the competitive strategy fails for the low-power negotiator
because his threats are not credible and his positions are not viewed by the opponent
as firm and unyielding. 172 Instead, the opponent perceives that she has greater power
and believes that she can extract further concessions from the negotiator. 173 There-
fore, the greater the opponent's power over the negotiator, the greater the negotiator's
incentive to engage in cooperative or integrative bargaining. 174 Fortunately for less
powerful negotiators, empirical research suggests that powerful and high-status
negotiators are likely to respond favorably to noncompetitive bargaining strategies. 75
Experiments indicate that subjects who were in low-status situations received better
results against high-status opponents when they used appeals based on justice rather
than when they used appeals based on their constituencies' self-advancements.
76
This is true in part because normative concerns constrain the use of power, and
because powerful negotiators are inclined to be generous toward less powerful
negotiators. '77 A powerful negotiator's belief that her opponent is committed to
justice motivates her to act in a just manner and often counteracts the tendency to
believe that one's own bargaining position is superior and that concessions are
170. See supra note 80.
171. See D. PRUITT, supra note 19, at 87-88; Fisher, supra note 165, at 151.
172. D. Pturrr, supra note 19, at 113-15.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66.
174. Social psychologists' surveys of existing negotiating behavior have generally shown that negotiators with
greater power than their opponents are more likely to adopt a competitive approach. See S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER,
supra note 163, at 89-96. These research results are consistent with the "zero-sum" approach, which suggests that an
increase in the negotiator's bargaining power increases the toughness of the negotiator's concession tactics. See id. at
90-92. A conflicting theory, the "variable-sum" approach, suggests instead that an increase in the negotiator's bargaining
power decreases the opponent's toughness. Id. at 92.
175. See Cook & Emerson, Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks, 43 Amt. Soc. REv. 721, 737
(1978); Tjosvold, Commitment to Justice in Conflict Between Unequal Status Persons, 7 J. AP'uED Soc. PsYctoLoGY 149,
160 (1977).
176. See Tjosvold, supra note 175, at 160. See generally Hamner & Baird, The Effect of Strategy, Pressure to Reach
Agreement and Relative Power on Bargaining Behavior, in BARGAINING BEHAvtOR 247, 265 (H. Sauermann ed. 1978).
177. See Cook & Emerson, supra note 175, at 737. In his study of negotiation tactics, Professor Donohue
conjectured that a negotiator's cooperative moves would result in a corresponding increase in his opponent's competitive
moves. Donohue, supra note 149, at 285. Experimental results, however, indicated that after a cooperative move, 66%
of the opponents used cooperative tactics. Id. Professor Donohue postulates that these results "may reflect a norm of
reciprocity or cooperativeness in the negotiation in which it became unacceptable to kick a person when he/she was
down." Id.
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unwarranted. 78 A noncompetitive strategy, therefore, appears more likely than a
competitive one to yield favorable results for a negotiator who faces a more powerful
opponent. Other social scientists, particularly Professors W. Clay Hamner and Lloyd
Baird, have reached the slightly different conclusion that "[p]erhaps the only way to
offset the disadvantage of low power is to be tough initially and then become more
yielding over time.' ' 79
3. Future Dealings with the Opponent
The third important factor to consider in choosing a negotiating strategy is the
likelihood of future interaction with the opposing party. When a relationship between
the parties will likely continue, a noncompetitive approach is recommended, 80
because the competitive strategy often generates distrust and ill will. These negative
feelings may harm the negotiator in future dealings with the opponent. I8 ' Although
occasionally a negotiator who anticipates a continued relationship with the opponent
may desire to use a competitive strategy in order to establish a strong bargaining
image and discourage future exploitation by an opponent, another strategy will
usually be preferred; the competitive strategy often results in social disapproval within
the bargaining community and retaliation for violating fairness norms.'8 2 If a
negotiator knows that the negotiation is a one-shot transaction, she can afford to use
a competitive strategy; but if the negotiators will have repeated contact, like the
situation facing a prosecutor and a public defender,18 3 a noncompetitive approach is
suggested. Empirical research of existing negotiation practice demonstrates repeat-
edly that a negotiator will adopt either a cooperative or an integrative approach when
she expects future contact with the opponent and the opponent acts cooperatively or
appears to be a cooperative person.' 84
4. The Attitude of the Negotiator's Client
The choice of the best negotiating strategy may also depend on whether a
negotiator is representing himself or a client. I8 5 As previously noted, the formal
178. See Tjosvold, supra note 175, at 158-59.
179. Hamner & Baird, supra note 176, at 265.
180. See D. PRtuns, supra note 19, at 39-40, 109-12; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 105-09; Roering, Slusher &
Schooler, Commitment to Future Interaction in Marketing Transactions, 60 J. APPLIED PSyCHOLOGy 386, 386-87 (1975);
Rubin, supra note 90, at 137.
181. See Pruitt, supra note 20, at 184; Roering, Slusher & Schooler, supra note 180, at 386-87.
182. A study by Professor Slusher suggests that negotiators who are concerned about enhancing prospects for a good
future working relationship with the opponent should avoid entering the negotiation with a cooperative orientation and a
plan to switch to a competitive strategy at a later stage. Goodwill between the negotiators is more likely to result when
the negotiator changes from an early competitive strategy to a cooperative orientation. The study, unfortunately, did not
consider the prospect of using a cooperative strategy throughout the negotiation. See Slusher, Counterpart Strategy, Prior
Relations, and Constituent Pressure in a Bargaining Simulation, 23 BEHAVIOR Sc. 470, 476 (1978).
183. See infra text accompanying notes 271-74.
184. See Gruder, Relationships with Opponent and Partner in Mixed-Motive Bargaining, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOLtroN
403,413-15 (1971); Roering, Slusher & Schooler, supra note 180, at 386-87; see also D. INurrr, supra note 19, at 39-40,
109-12.
185. See D. Peurrr, supra note 19, at 41-45, 120-21; Lamm, Group-Related Influences on Negotiation Behavior:
Two.Person Negotiation as a Function of Representation and Election, in BARGAINING BEHAVIOR 284, 297-302 (H.
Sauermann ed. 1978).
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norms governing the practice of law provide that the client establish certain param-
eters for the choice of a negotiation strategy. ' 86 Beyond this, the attorney's desire to
maintain rapport with an adversarial client often necessitates the adoption of a
competitive strategy. 187 Visibly competitive tactics may convince a client otherwise
not inclined to trust his attorney that his attorney is representing his interests and is
not "selling out" to the opponent. ' 88 In simulated negotiations, social scientists have
found that representatives who are accountable to constituents are more likely to be
tough and to use competitive tactics.' 89
5. Pressure to Reach Agreement
Various kinds of pressure to reach an agreement may also affect the choice of the
most appropriate negotiation strategy. Clients often desire an early conclusion to
negotiations for a number of reasons: they may need settlement proceeds immedi-
ately, desire to minimize legal fees and other expenses resulting from prolonged
negotiations, and want to minimize the psychological strain associated with continued
conflict. '9 0 Pressure to reach an agreement also results from imminent trial deadlines
and judicial attempts to settle cases. Finally, expeditious settlement is often a
necessity for attorneys who have heavy caseloads, such as urban prosecutors and
public defenders. Pressure to settle a case quickly, from whatever source, suggests
using a noncompetitive strategy,'91 and usually a cooperative strategy as opposed to
an integrative one. 192 Social scientists' research shows that time pressures result in
lower demands, faster concessions, and lower aspiration levels. 193 Although these
186. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983); see also supra text accompanying notes
144-47.
187. See generally D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 5, at 147-55. If a negotiator represents a radical constituency,
he may have to play conflicting roles in order to achieve the best possible result. To convince his constituency that he is
firmly committed to its goals, the negotiator may be obliged to behave competitively in public. The negotiator may
recognize, however, that the extreme position advocated by his constituency is untenable; consequently, he may adopt a
more moderate approach during private sessions when the opponent understands that the public display of competitiveness
is for the benefit of the negotiator's constituency. See R. WALTON & R. McKERstE, supra note 34. at 417-19; see also
infra text accompanying notes 381-85.
188. See infra notes 277-79, 381-85 and accompanying text.
189. See D. PRuTrr, supra note 19, at 42, 120-21. 196; Lamm, supra note 185. at 297. Professor Lamm's
experiment was designed to detect whether a difference exists in the negotiation behavior of persons negotiating for
themselves as opposed to those negotiating for a constituency. The results indicated that the negotiation performance of
nonelected representatives did not differ from that of negotiators who were bargaining for themselves. However.
representatives who were elected by their constituencies presumably felt greater pressure to obtain good resultN and
responded by bargaining with "greater toughness." Id. at 284. Ironically, this tough strategy was found to result in inferior
outcomes for their constituencies. The risky negotiation tactics employed by the tough negotiators frequently resulted in
negotiation breakdowns and lower profits. Id.
When the constituency attends the negotiation, the gender of the representative and his or her constituency may be
a significant factor in predicting which strategy will be employed. Research indicates that male negotiators representing
male constituencies are likely to negotiate competitively when their clients are present during negotiations. Female
representatives of female constituencies, on the other hand, believe that their constituents expect them to behave more
cooperatively during negotiations: thus, the presence or absence of the constituency has little effect on the female
negotiator's strategy. See Benton, Bargaining Visibilit) and the Attitudes and Negotiation Behavior of Male and Female
Group Representatives, 43 J. PERSONALITY 661, 675-76 (1975).
190. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19. at 30-3 1.
191. See id.; see also Hamner, supra note 43, at 465.
192. See D. PRUITr, supra note 19, at 121-22; Pruitt, supra note 20, at 171-72.
193. See D. PRUtrr, supra note 19, at 30-31.
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studies are descriptive and do not necessarily intend to recommend a cooperative
strategy, they indicate that each negotiator will likely reciprocate the other's conces-
sions when the parties are pressured to reach an agreement. 194 Further, concession-
granting often concludes negotiations quickly; competitive tactics and proposed
integrative solutions require further responses from the opponent as part of continued
negotiation and therefore involve more time.
6. The Stage of the Negotiation
In most negotiations, not just those in which considerable pressure to reach
agreement is felt, the negotiator's choice of strategic moves may depend on the stage
of the negotiation.195 The possibility of changing strategies during a negotiation
previously was described as feasible under the strategic choice model. 196 Competitive
strategic moves serve important functions early in the negotiation. 197 They suggest to
the opponent that the negotiator will not concede easily and also help to convince the
client that the negotiator is working vigorously on his behalf. 198 In order for the
negotiators to reach an agreement and conclude the negotiations, however, at least
one of the parties must make a noncompetitive move: either one or both parties must
make concessions or devise an integrative solution.
7. The Negotiator's Personality
Although the negotiator's personality should not dictate her choice of negotiation
strategy, 199 personality inevitably affects the ability of the negotiator to implement a
particular strategy. 200 Therefore, a negotiator must consider her own personality when
choosing a strategy. Research demonstrates that negotiators who exhibit personality
traits such as authoritarianism, 20 1 high self-esteem, 202 risk aversion,2 03 and strong
internal control2°4 are more likely to choose a competitive approach; presumably these
same traits increase the likelihood that a negotiator will be effective in employing a
194. See Hamner, supra note 43, at 464.
195. See generally I. MORLEY & G. STEPHENSON, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING 38-40 (1977); D. PRurIr,
supra note 19, at 131-35; G. WI.LIAmS, supra note 3, at 70-72, 7742, 84-86.
196. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text; see also G. \VILJAMS, supra note 3, at 81-82; Lowenthal,
supra note 5, at 75.
197. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 132, 135.
198. See id. at 135. See generally Donohue, supra note 149, at 285.
199. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
200. See G. VIuIA.Is, supra note 3, at 41-42; Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 109-12; Menkel-Meadow, supra note
11, at 836-38.
201. See, e.g., Berkowitz, Alternative Measures of Authoritarianism, Response Sets, and Prediction in a Two-Per-
son Game, 74 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 233 (1968); Deutsch, Trust, Trustworthiness and the F Scale, 61 J. ABNORIAL &SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 138 (1960); Haythorn, Couch, Haefner, Langham & Carter, The Behavior ofAuthoritarian and Equalitarian
Personalities in Groups, 9 Hutm. REL.. 57 (1956); Wrightsman, Personality and Attitudinal Correlates of Trusting and
Trustworthy Behaviors in a Two-Person Game, 4 J. PESONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 328 (1966).
202. See, e.g., C. KARRAss, supra note 8, at 87-88; Faucheux & Moscovici, Self-Esteem and Exploitive Behavior
in a Game Against Chance and Nature, 8 J. PERSONALtITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 83 (1968). But see R. VALTON & R.
McKERsIE, supra note 34, at 194-95. ,
203. Harnett, Cummings & Hamner, supra note 19, at 340.
204. Id.
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competitive strategy and in undermining the opponent's belief in his own position. 205
Conversely, cognitive complexity (intelligence), 20 6 and passivity, which Professor
Gerald Williams refers to as "a clear tendency to be a milquetoast," 20 7 are personality
traits identified with persons who typically pursue a noncompetitive approach. A
person who is able to develop trust and good working relationships and who is able
to persuade is likely to be effective as a cooperative negotiator. 20 8
8. Negotiation Norms
Finally, the norms associated with a negotiation strongly affect the choice of a
negotiation strategy. 209 These norms include both formal rules governing professional
conduct210 and informal but generally accepted conventions of the negotiation
context. For example, Professor Gerald Williams' survey of Phoenix lawyers sug-
gests that the mere threat of filing a lawsuit in a commercial or real property dispute
is regarded as a "heavy-handed" tactic, likely to incur the wrath of the opponent and
be counterproductive. 2 t2 The informal norm in these disputes, therefore, suggests the
use of a noncompetitive strategy. On the other hand, personal injury specialists regard
a desire to settle a case either prior to filing a lawsuit or perhaps even more than a few
months before trial as a dangerously noncompetitve tactic likely to lead to exploitation
by the predominantly competitive negotiators in that environment. The relative
acceptance of competitive and noncompetitive strategies may also depend on the
geographic area in which an attorney practices.2 12 More generally, Professor Wil-
liams' survey of the negotiating traits of lawyers suggests two very important
conclusions about negotiations in the legal context: lawyers use predominantly
noncompetitive strategies, 21 3 and they expect opposing counsel to reciprocate. 2 4
205. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
206. See generally Driver, Individual Differences as Determinants of Aggression in the Inter-Nation Simulation, in
A PSYCIOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS 335 (M. Hermann ed. 1977); Phelan & Richardson, Cognitive
Complexity, Strategy of the Other Player, and Two-Person Game Behavior, 71 J. PSYCHOLOGY 205 (1969).
207. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 41.
208. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
209. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 44, 81-82; Lowenthal, supra note 5. at 98-105.
210. Several of the provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct regulate attorneys' conduct in bargaining.
See Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 100-05. For example, rule 3.3(a)(1) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make
a false statement of material fact or law. ... MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1983). This rule
restricts, at least at its periphery, the competitive strategy.
211. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 81-82.
212. Id. at 44.
213. Professor Williams' survey did not consider competitive, cooperative, or integrative strategies as defined in this
article. Instead, Professor Williams asked the surveyed attorneys to describe an opponent in a negotiation, using any of
137 characteristics listed in his questionnaire, and to rate the attorney as an effective, average, or ineffective negotiator.
Id. at 17. Using the results, Professor Williams was able to place most of the negotiators into either a cooperative category
or a competitive category, according to the groups of personal characteristics used to describe them. Id. at 18-25.
Professor Williams found that 65% of all attorneys studied possessed personality traits which he described as "a
cooperative approach to negotiation"; only 24% of the attorneys studied used a competitive approach. Id. at 18.
214. The surveyed attorneys described even those competitive attorneys that they found effective to be egotistical
and arrogant. Id. at 23. They described 38% of the cooperative attorneys as effective, but only 6% of the competitive
attorneys as effective. Id. at 19. Only 2% of the cooperative attorneys were regarded as ineffective, as compared to 8%
of the competitive attorneys. Id. These ratings, completed by the negotiators' opponents, probably are not objective
indications of the attorneys' effectiveness; however, they strongly suggest the perceived conventional practices among
lawyer-negotiators and how those who deviate from the norm are viewed.
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B. Choosing the Appropriate Noncompetitive Strategy: Cooperative or
Integrative?
If a negotiator determines that a noncompetitive strategy will be most advanta-
geous, he must then choose between a cooperative or an integrative strategy. As
previously described, these two noncompetitive strategies are distinct.215 The coop-
erative negotiator grants concessions in order to build a moral obligation for the
opponent to reciprocate.216 The integrative bargainer seeks to invent options that will
satisfy the underlying interests of both parties.217 Factors to consider in choosing
between the two noncompetitive approaches are discussed below.
1. The Nature of the Negotiation
First, a negotiator must consider whether the negotiation is a zero-sum negoti-
ation or a non-zero sum negotiation. In some negotiations, the parties seek to divide
a fixed pie, a finite amount of resources or widgets; the gain of one party necessarily
comes at the expense of the other party. 218 This type of bargaining situation has been
referred to by various negotiation theorists as a zero-sum game, 219 distributive
bargaining,220 or share bargaining. 22' Examples of zero-sum negotiations include the
bargaining between the buyer and the seller about the cash price of a used car, and
the negotiations between the prosecutor and a defense attorney about the length of a
recommended sentence.
Many negotiations, on the other hand, involve a non-zero sum 22 2 or problem-
solving223 situation. In these cases, collaboration between the two negotiating parties
may increase the total number of widgets or the resources available to the parties.224
For example, a profit sharing arrangement may increase both workers' wages and
corporate profits if it induces the workers to increase their productivity. Although
many negotiation problems have non-zero sum aspects, it is unrealistic to view all
negotiations, such as those between a repeat felony offender and a prosecutor or
between a paraplegic accident victim and the negligent driver's insurance company,
215. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
218. For another discussion of the distinction between zero-sum and non-zero sum negotiations, see Lowenthal,
supra note 5, at 95-96.
219. See E. McGiNNtEs, supra note 80, at 414. The term is borrowed from game theory. See supra note 149 for texts
that discuss game theory.
220. See R. WALTON & R. McKE st, supra note 34, at 4.
221. See C. KARRAss, supra note 8, at 127.
222. See E. McGINNIES, supra note 80, at 417-19.
223. See C. KAR.Ass, supra note 8, at 128.
224. Professor Pruitt illustrates a non-zero sum situation with the example of a married couple trying to decide where
to spend a vacation. D. Pturrr, supra note 19, at 137. The wife prefers the seashore, but the husband prefers the
mountains. The most important interest underlying the wife's preference is that the seashore allows swimming and
sunning; the husband, on the other hand, values fishing and hiking. The parties engage in integrative bargaining and find
a new alternative that satisfies both of their underlying interests: they agree on an inland resort with a lake and a sandy
beach near a state park that affords hiking and fishing. By examining their underlying interests, the parties find a non-zero
sum solution that increases their total satisfaction beyond either of the original alternatives. Id.
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as predominantly non-zero sum situations. 225 Integrative bargaining is a feasible
approach only to the extent that a negotiation has non-zero sum aspects. If the
bargaining context is a zero-sum situation and all the factors predominantly suggest
a noncompetitive strategy, the cooperative strategy is recommended.
2. The Number of Disputed Issues
Second, a negotiator must consider the number of disputed issues when choosing
between the cooperative and integrative negotiation strategies. The more issues that
the parties must negotiate, the greater the opportunity for integrative bargaining.2 26
One type of integrative bargaining previously discussed, logrolling, 227 depends on the
existence of multiple issues. Because each negotiator values the importance of various
issues differently, a negotiator will be able to satisfy the other party's interests, as well
as his own, by trading concessions on issues. Accordingly, the existence of multiple
issues suggests the adoption of an integrative approach.2 28
3. The Desire to Maximize Joint Benefit
The successful use of the integrative strategy, as opposed to the cooperative
strategy, ultimately depends on the parties' shared desire to maximize both their own
and the opponent's gains. 229 Several identifiable characteristics of a negotiation can
contribute to the requisite motivation. First, when the negotiators have high aspira-
225. However, the negotiator must be aware that integrative solutions may be promising even in situations that
appear to be strictly zero-sum problems. For example, even the settlement between a parapalegic victim and an insurance
company may have integrative aspects. Although the interests of the parties in the amount of the settlement directly
conflict, the parties may be able to agree to a structured settlement with periodic payments to the injured plaintiff over
the remainder of the plaintiff's life. The structured settlement satisfies the claimant's need for replacement income, but
decreases the insurance company's out-of-pocket expenses. See Bielawski, Structuring Settlements: Avoiding Pitfalls,
TRIAL, June 1983, at 47; Lampo & Waldeck, Structured Settlements: A Primer, 39 J. Mo. B. 181 (1983); Wisner &
Atkinson, Structuring Settlements: Winning Isn't Everything, TRIAL, June 1983, at 50. Professors Fisher and Ury's model
of principled negotiation emphasizes the possibility and the desirability of finding opportunities for integrative solutions
when they are not immediately obvious. See R. FisHER & W. URY, supra note 3, at 41-46, 58-83; see also
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 772-75, 785-89. Professor Menkel-Meadow concludes that "[n]ot every legal dispute
or transaction can be transformed into a non-zero sum or cooperative game, but zero-sum games in legal negotiations may
be more the exception than the rule." Id. at 787.
226. See Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 96-98. See generally H. RAiFFA, supra note 67, at 131-42, 145-65.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
228. If multiple issues make integrative bargaining possible, then the existence of multiple parties make integrative
bargaining necessary. See H. RAIFTA, supra note 67, at 251-55, 285-87. See generally id. at 251-326. For example,
Professor Raiffa describes concession-based negotiations, whether competitive or cooperative, in a multiparty setting as
follows:
Consider the dance of packages. Before a meeting takes place with all parties, a subset of the parties might get
together and concoct a package to be offered by their loose coalition. At a later stage two separate coalitions,
offering different opening packages, might join forces and devise a compromise package. If there are fifteen
parties, there may on the table initially be six packages, which may fuse to four and then to three. Packages
change continually: some fuse; others fractionate and come together with shifting coalitions. Likewise, building
up a contract issue by issue gets harder and harder to do when parties are added.
Id. at 253.
Multiparty bargaining requires frequent logrolling, see supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text, and the use of
other integrative techniques, see H. RAiFA, supra note 67, at 211-14, 254-55. The study of strategy in multiparty
negotiations is based on coalition analysis. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 67, at 257-74.
229. See D. Pttrur, supra note 19, at 112-13; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 836-38.
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tions and high limits in negotiations, an integrative approach is recommended. 230
High limits and aspirations complicate making concessions, and, therefore, discour-
age the use of a cooperative strategy. 23' Second, both parties' possession of high
power or high threat capacity-if each can inflict substantial harm on the other
party-also contributes to the motivation for integrative bargaining. 232 In this context,
other negotiation strategies will often be counterproductive: the competitive strategy
may lead to stalemate, 233 while the cooperative strategy risks exploitation. 234 Finally,
deadlocked negotiations on one hand, and pressure to reach agreement quickly on the
other hand, affect the utility of integrative negotiations in very different ways.
Deadlock often suggests that the parties regard themselves as unable to bargain
cooperatively by making further unilateral concessions; integrative bargaining may
emerge at this point.2 35 Conversely, pressure to reach agreement quickly will most
likely lead to a pattern of concession-granting and a cooperative strategy, 236 instead
of the integrative strategy which requires more time to explore the possibilities of
brainstorming 237 and logrolling. 238
IV. SYSTEMIC CHOICE OF NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES:
AN EXPOSITION AND THREE EXAMPLES
A. Negotiation Context as the Critical Variable
A mere list of factors to consider in deciding on an optimal negotiation strategy
is of limited practical use. Of course, when all factors suggest a single strategy, no
problem arises.239 As Professor Gary Lowenthal admits after his discussion of similar
factors, "When the factors analyzed . . . point in different directions, however,
strategy decisions obviously are more complicated, and it is extremely difficult to
determine the extent to which the two modes of negotiation can be combined in a
single bargaining interaction."-2 40 Negotiation theorists have failed to provide nego-
tiators with a method for either ranking the importance of the factors or weighing the
effects of various factors. Even if this were possible (and it probably is not) the
practicing lawyer would be required to engage in a complicated weighing or analyzing
process on an ad hoc basis prior to each negotiation.
230. The term high limits indicates that the minimum settlement which is acceptable to the negotiator is relatively
near the negotiator's original position. See D. PRumr, supra note 19, at 25-26; see also supra notes 103-04 and
accompanying text.
231. D. PRnrr, supra note 19, at 119-20; Pritt, supra note 20, at 169.
232. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 113-15. Conversely, mutual threat capacity may discourage integrative
solutions when one or both parties use this capacity because such actions result in hostile feelings that block joint efforts.
See id. at 114-15; see also Deutsch & Krauss, Tie Effect of Threat Upon Interpersonal Bargaining, 61 J. ABNORIAL &
Soc. PsYcIOLOGY 181, 188 (1960).
233. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
235. See D. Purrr, supra note 19, at 121-23.
236. Id. at 30-31, 121.
237. See supra text accompanying note 115.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
239. See Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 112.
240. Id.
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The factors that determine the likelihood of success of each bargaining strategy,
however, do not occur randomly within the legal system. These factors repeatedly
occur within the contexts, categorized by the substantive law involved, in which
particular types of cases are negotiated. For example, attorneys who represent labor
unions will almost inevitably be pushed, in the intial stage3 of negotiations, toward
adopting a competitive strategy so that their clients perceive them as vigorous
advocates. 24'
The optimal negotiation strategy depends on the negotiation context. 242 If it is
possible to identify factors that will be present in most negotiations of a particular
kind, such as labor negotiations, personal injury negotiations, or plea bargaining, then
it is possible to recommend a negotiation strategy for each context which is likely to
be the optimal strategy. The negotiator needs to weigh and prioritize various factors
only once to determine the appropriate standard operating procedure for a particular
type of negotiation. 243 Of course, idiosyncratic factors, such as an opposing negoti-
ator with an unusually antagonistic personality, might occasionally make the recom-
mended strategy inappropriate. 244 Nevertheless, it would be a major accomplishment
for negotiation theorists if they could teach lawyers, law students, and other nego-
tiators which strategy is most likely to succeed within a particular specialty.
The subsequent parts of this section apply the factors that affect the choice of a
negotiation strategy discussed above to the choice of negotiation strategies facing
attorneys in three distinct negotiation situations: plea bargaining, personal injury
negotiations, and collective bargaining. In each context, certain systemic character-
istics which are likely to be present in most specific bargaining transactions are
241. See infra note 377 and accompanying text; see also R. WALTON & R. McKmESIE, supra note 34, at 205.
242. Professor Menkel-Meadow reports that she previously attempted to develop a typology of cases with the more
limited objective of identifying which classifications of cases were zero-sum and which were non-zero sum; however, she
concluded "that although some case types may seem to be more determinately zero-sum, there are within each case type
many individual cases that may be subject to non-zero sum resolutions." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 785 n. 120.
She warns that any attempted classification of cases may lead to "the stigmatizing effect of labeling certain case types
as uniformly zero-sum. The stereotyping of cases may limit solutions in the very cases we hope to solve more creatively."
Id. Professor Menkel-Meadow is correct in identifying this risk. The model proposed here attempts to mitigate that risk
by acknowledging the importance of idiosyncratic factors which may justify modification of the recommended strategies.
See infra notes 244, 305-06 and accompanying text.
243. Predictions about human behavior play a key role in a variety of decisions other than those concerning the
choice of a negotiation strategy, including releases from prison and admissions to educational institutions. See generally
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88
YALE L.J. 1408, 1408-09 (1979). One of two competing approaches can be used to aid the decisionmaker clinical or
statistical. Id. at 1420-21. The clinical method "relies on the subjective judgment of experienced decisionmakers, who
evaluate each applicant on an individual basis ...." Id. at 1420. The statistical method makes predictions based on "a
predetermined rule for counting and weighting key characteristics." Id. Surprisingly, the available empiricial evidence
suggests that the statistical method yields fewer predictive errors than the clinical method. Id. at 1424. In addition, the
statistical method takes less time and skill. Id. at 1425. To the extent that negotiators currently are conscious of their
choices of negotiation strategy at all, they use a clinical method. If negotiators apply the factors discussed above on an
ad hoc basis to individual strategic choices during negotiations, then they will use a more informed clinical approach. On
the other hand, to the extent that negotiators choose a negotiation strategy based on the single variable of the substantive
negotiating context, they will use an implicitly statistical approach.
244. See supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text. Certain factors that affect the choice of negotiation strategy
may be recurring ones, but they do not relate to the substantive milieu. Examples of such variables include the gender of
the opposing negotiatior, see, e.g., H. EDWARDS & J. WITm, supra note 3, at 363-65; J. RuBiN & B. BRoWN, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 169-74 (1975); Wall & Virtue, Women as Negotiators, Bus. HotuzoNs, Apr.
1976, at 67, or the race or culture of the negotiator, see, e.g., C. PECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIATION 233-34
(2d ed. 1980); J. RuBIN & B. BROWN, supra, at 162-65.
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identified. Therefore, a standard operating procedure can be prescribed for attorneys
operating within each area. Not surprisingly, the strategies recommended here by
applying the factors previously discussed are similar to the ones currently recom-
mended by skilled and experienced negotiators who gleaned their insights from the
school of hard knocks. This rough correlation helps validate the method outlined here
to analyze and choose an optimal strategy and supports this method's potential use to
recommend negotiation strategies in other contexts.
B. The Defense Attorney's Strategy in Plea Bargaining45
It is possible to recommend a plea bargaining strategy likely to be effective in
most cases, because the plea bargaining process generally exhibits certain character-
istics that determine which strategy is likely to succeed, even though the specific
mechanics of plea bargaining and behavior patterns of prosecutors and defense
attorneys vary from one locality to another246 and from one case to another. The
defense attorney's negotiation strategy247 is construed broadly here to include not only
formal plea discussions, but also tactical considerations in deciding whether to file
particular motions, 248 how to handle discovery and the exchange of information in
245. Plea bargaining is the process of negotiation between the prosecutor representing the government and the
attorney representing the defendant in a criminal case. See generally J. BOND. PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS §§
1.01-.09 (1978); L. KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES 193-202 (1972); D. NEWMAN,
CONVICTON: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OF INNOCENCE wrrHOUT TRIAL 78-104 (1966). In exchange for foregoing his right
to a jury trial, the defendant typically receives some consideration for his guilty plea. Most frequently, the prosecutor
makes a concession by allowing the defendant to plead to a reduced charge or a lesser included offense that reduces the
maximum punishment the judge can impose. See J. BOND, supra, § 1.07[3]; D. NEWMAN, supra, at 79-83. In the
alternative, the prosecutor may dismiss some of the multiple charges against the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea
to one or more offenses. See J. BOND, supra, § 1.07[4]. In other cases, the prosecutor may agree to recommend a sentence
to thejudge that is favorable to the defendant. Id. §1.07[5]; White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process,
119 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 443 (1971). Less frequently, a desire to avoid a felony record or a record with convictions on
certain crimes, such as sex offenses which carry negative connotations and a repugnant label, motivates a defendant to
plead guilty. See D. NEwtN, supra, at 105-I1. Defendants sometimes plead guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's
promise not to file additional charges. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (Absent prosecutorial
vindictiveness, due process is not violated when a defendant is indicted on a felony charge after refusing to plead guilty
to pending misdemeanor charges arising from the same incident.); Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (So long
as the accused is plainly subject to the more serious charges, due process does not prohibit the prosecutor from carrying
out a threat to reindict the accused on more serious charges if he refuses to plead guilty to the offense originally charged.);
J. BOND, supra, § 1.07[6). Defendants may also plead guilty in exchange for a recommendation that a sentence be served
in a certain custodial facility. See People v. Dreusike, 42 A.D.2d 920, 348 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1973) (youthful offender sought
reformatory sentence rather than commitment to state prison); J. BOND, supra, § 1.07[6]. In many cases, defendants who
plead guilty receive more lenient sentences even without an implicit bargain with the prosecutor orjudge. See D. NEWMAN,
supra, at 60-62.
246. See D. NEWMAN, supra note 245, at 78-90; Klonoski, Mitchell & Gallagher, Plea Bargaining in Oregon: An
Exploratory Study, 50 OR. L. REv. 114, 116 (1971).
247. The development and implementation of a strategy for plea bargaining initially may seem unrealistic, because
many cases are resolved in face-to-face conferences between the defense attorney and the prosecutor that last one or two
minutes or even less. See M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE ExPEIENCES OF PROsEcUTORS, JUDGES. AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS 35 (1977). This routine slotting of cases, and the essentially bureaucratic decisions by prosecutors as to what
concessions will be made, occur in many misdemeanor cases. See id. at 35-40. A more sophisticated process of offer and
counter-offer usually occurs in felony cases. See id. at 41-46. See generally A. RosErr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY
CONSENT. PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERIcAN COURTHOUSE 85-144 (1976).
248. See, e.g., M. HEUMANN, supra note 247, at 61-69; see also infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
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plea bargaining, 249 the timing of the guilty plea, and all informal discussions with the
prosecutor. 250
The first factor a defense attorney should consider in choosing a negotiation
strategy is the strategy of the opponent-the prosecutor. 251 Although few prosecutors
consciously design a purposeful negotiation strategy, an identifiable pattern exists in
most prosecutors' opening demands and concessions. This pattern can usefully be
identified as a strategy. Even though the exact concessions granted by prosecutors in
plea bargaining are characterized by prosecutor individuality, 252 the prosecutor's
overall strategy, in most cases, is substantially defined by certain characteristics of the
criminal justice system and the prosecutor's role in it.
The charges initially filed against the defendant, together with the probable
sentence after conviction, determine the prosecutor's opening demand in plea bar-
gaining negotiations. In almost all cases, the prosecutor's opening demand mirrors
what would be expected from a negotiatior who follows the competitive strategy: a
high, but credible, demand. The initial charge is usually a high demand both because
the prosecutor has overcharged 253 and because legislatively defined criminal sen-
249. See generally 3 A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 103 (1978).
250. See Allen & Strickland, Negotiating Pleas in Criminal Cases, PRAc LAw, Jan. 1971, at 35, 39; Penn,
Negotiations in a Crininal Case-Defense, in ILLINOIS INST. FOR COTINUINO LEGAL EDUC, supra note 2, § 13.7.
251. See F. BAILEY & H. RomBLATrr. HANDLING MISDEMEANOR CASES 20-21 (1976).
252. Empirical studies of prosecutors' plea bargaining practices demonstrate the individuality and inconsistency of
concessions made by prosecutors in plea bargaining. See, e.g., White, supra note 245, at 448; see also Lagoy, Senna &
Siegel, An Empirical Study of Information Usage for Prosecutorial Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13 Am Cram.
L. REV. 435, 462 (1976); Comment, Factors Affecting the Plea Bargaining Process in Erie County: Some Tentative
Findings, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 693, 700-02 (1977). In surveys of bargaining practices among New York and Philadelphia
prosecutors, defense attorneys reported marked disparities in concessions offered by individual prosecutors. See White,
supra note 245, at 448. Similarly, a study of plea bargains in the Erie County, New York, District Attorney's office found
that the prosecutors studied handled similar cases differently; however, the differences may not be statistically significant
given the size of the sample. Comment, supra, at 702. Finally, Professors Lagoy, Senna, and Siegel, after their plea
bargaining study of actual prosecutors and defense attorneys using simulated case histories, concluded:
As a result of this project, the major impression with which one is left is that of prosecutorial individuality.
This is certainly consistent with traditional prediction of wide prosecutorial discretion. But the degree to which
information selection, sorting, and weighing vary even within the same office tends to confirm the worst fears
of critics-that equal defendants will receive unequal treatment from prosecutors seated at opposite sides of the
same desk.
Lagoy, Senna & Siegel, supra, at 462. The recognition of individual differences in the size and frequency of prosecutorial
concessions in plea bargaining, however, does not contradict the argument that prosecutors will follow an identifiable
pattern in plea bargaining. See infra notes 281-89 and accompanying text.
253. Most prosecutors overcharge, at least in the sense that they file the most serious crimes that the evidence will
support, even when conviction on the charged offenses is questionable. See L. WEINREB. DENIAL OF JUSTICE. CRIMNALh
PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 57-59 (1977); Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary
Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 500-07 (1980); Gifford, Meaningful Reform
of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 37, 47-49. "Overcharging" is an
ambiguous term. Sometimes it is used to refer to the filing of charges when the prosecutor does not even have sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause. This type of overcharging clearly violates the formal norms governing
the prosecutor in plea bargaining. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 3.8 (1983); see also supra note 210
and accompanying text; Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV 174, 178-80 (1965).
Some commentators even consider it overcharging to charge provable offenses when equitable factors suggest that these
charges are inappropriately harsh. See Gifford, supra, at 49; see also 1 AmERtCAN BAR ASSN. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 3-3.9(b) (2d ed. 1980).
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tences are generally unrealistically lengthy.254 Overcharging allows the prosecutor to
make concessions, in the form of reduced charges, to the defendant in order to
encourage him to plead guilty.2 55 The initial charge also is a threat to the defendant: 256
if he does not enter into an agreement, then he might be convicted on more serious
charges and serve a longer sentence. 257
Although the prosecutor's strategy may include both competitive and coopera-
tive tactics as plea bargaining proceeds, her strategy will probably become predom-
inantly cooperative. 258 The primary factor accounting for the frequency of a coop-
erative strategy among prosecutors in the later stages of plea bargaining is the
prosecutor's unique role as a "minister of justice.' 259 The prosecutor's goal is not to
maximize the length of the defendant's sentence or even the severity of the crime to
which the defendant pleads. Empirical studies suggest that a prosecutor's attempt to
individualize justice by considering equitable factors about the circumstances of the
offense and the characteristics of the offender, 26° such as the youth of the defendant,
the lack of a prior criminal record, and provocation by the victim, provides the
primary motivation for a prosecutor to make bargaining concessions. 26' The
prosecutor's orientation in bargaining, therefore, parallels that of the cooperative
negotiator, who attempts to achieve a fair solution. Other factors contribute to the
prosecutor's cooperative orientation. These factors include her continuing relation-
ship with defense attorneys,2 62 pressures from judges and large caseloads to reach
agreement, 263 and the prevailing cooperative norms of plea bargaining.2 64 Finally, in
254. Sentences are often set by legislatures with heinous crimes and political reaction in mind; thus, statutory
sentences often reflect neither what an appropriate sentence would be nor what sentence the defendant will ultimately
serve. See TwENtmrr CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING. FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNIsHMvENT 31-34 (1976).
255. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
257. An analysis of plea bargaining practices in New York City revealed that the average sentences for defendants
who elected to go to trial was almost twice that of similar defendants who pleaded guilty. See Zeisel, The Offer That
Cannot be Refused, in F. ZMRINO & R. FRAsE, THE CRLMINAL JUSTICE SYSEI MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND
REr ot OF TItE CRLMNAL LAW 558-61 (1980). Another competitive tactic the prosecutor may use is a threat to charge
additional offenses if the defendant does not enter a guilty plea. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 370-80
(1982).
258. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of how a negotiator will often change strategies
during the course of a negotiation, usually from a competitive to a noncompetitive approach.
259. MODEL RULES OF PROFFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 comment (1983).
260. See M. HEUtANN, supra note 247, at 102-10; L. MATHER. PLEA BARGAINING ON TRIAL?: THE PROCESS OF
CRuSIINAL-CASE DIsPosmoN 87-88 (1979); D. NEwMAN, supra note 245, at 114-30; see also Gifford, supra note 253, at
42-45.
261. See Gifford, supra note 253, at 44. In a similar context, the American Bar Association's Standardsfor Criminal
Justice provides that "[t]he prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The
prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute,
notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction." AMEICAN BAR Ass'N, supra note
253, § 3-3.9(b).
262. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
264. See infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text. In addition, formal norms or rules govern the prosecutor's
strategy in bargaining and prevent the use of some competitive tactics. See, e.g., supra note 253. For example, competitive
negotiators selectively withhold information, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text, but the prosecutor is
constitutionally prevented from withholding information helpful to the defendant, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963) (state violates due process when it fails to disclose to the defendant exculpatory evidence within its possession);
see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-10 (1976). Furthermore, the prosecutor is constitutionally prohibited
from using certain kinds of threats in plea bargaining. Among the pressures the government may not use to encourage pleas
are "actual or threatened physical harm," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970), "mental coercion
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most cases the prosecutor can afford to adopt a noncompetitive rather than a
competitive strategy because she is not highly accountable to a constituent.265 Unlike
the defense attorney, whose concessions in plea bargaining must be ratified by his
client, the prosecutor makes independent decisions about bargaining concessions. In
any particular case, specific circumstances may influence the prosecutor to adopt a
competitive strategy. 266 However, the pattern of prosecutorial conduct discussed
above is prevalent enough to strongly influence the defense attorney's selection of a
negotiation strategy.
The second factor a defense attorney should- consider in choosing a negotiation
strategy is the relative bargaining power of the defense attorney compared to that of
the prosecutor. In most cases, the prosecutor possesses much greater power in plea
bargaining than does the defense attorney. 267 The consequences for the defendant of
failing to achieve an agreement with the prosecutor, that is, the defendant's "best
alternative to a negotiated agreement,''268 are not attractive. Most defendants have
little chance of being acquitted if they proceed to trial. According to Professor Milton
Heumann, "[M]ost of the defendants are factually guilty and have no legal grounds
to challenge the state's evidence."269 If convicted after trial, most defendants will
receive a sentence considerably longer than if they had pleaded guilty. 270
The defense attorney's plea bargaining strategy frequently will be affected by his
desire to maintain good working relationships with the prosecutor and the judge.
overbearing the will of the defendant," id., and "threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence," id.
at 751 n.8; see also Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942). Additionally, the government may not establish a
sentencing scheme that provides for the death penalty for every defendant convicted at trial, but that allows defendants
who plead guilty to receive more lenient sentences. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968).
265. See Gifford, supra note 253, at 53-54, 66-67. Most state and local prosecutors are popularly elected and, in
theory, can be defeated if the public disapproves of plea bargaining policies. In reality, however, most plea bargaining
decisions are not highly publicized, and elections of prosecutors are not referenda on bargaining tactics.
266. The prosecutor probably will not make unilateral concessions in bargaining if a repeat felon is charged with a
heinous crime and an outraged public is watching the case closely. In that situation, the assumptions that have been made
about the likelihood that the prosecutor will make unilateral concessions on equitable grounds, and the lack of public
accountability, are invalid. The presence of strong countervailing factors in a particular case may lead prosecutors to adopt
a competitive strategy.
267. See Gifford, supra note 253, at 45-51; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
269. M. HEUMANN, supra note 247, at 61. Professor Heumann found that "experienced defense attorneys agree that
of the approximately 90% of the defendants who are factually guilty, most have cases devoid of any legally disputable
issue." Id. at 60; see also P. Urz. SETrIINo THE FAmC: DisCRETION AND NEGOIATION IN CRttINAL COURT 34-35 (1978);
Mather, Some Determinants of the Method of Case Disposition: Decision-Making By Public Defenders in Los Angeles,
8 LAW & Soc'y REv. 187, 187-88 (1973).
270. See Zeisel, supra note 257, at 560-61. A survey conducted by the Yale Law Jlournal among federal district court
judges revealed that prison terms for defendants who pleaded guilty were discounted by 10% to 95% of the length of
incarceration that would have been imposed after trial and conviction. Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea
on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 206-09 (1956); see also Brereton & Casper, Does it Pay to
Plead Guilty?: Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & Soc'y REv. 45 (1981); Shin,
Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing and Parole Processes, I J. CRiut. Jusr. 27, 31 (1973).
The prosecutor's power advantage that results from the defendant's unattractive "best alternative to a negotiated
agreement" is to some extent offset by two factors. First, most prosecutors often face considerable pressure to settle cases
because their overwhelming caseloads allow them to try only a fraction of their cases. See supra notes 209-10 and
accompanying text. Second, defense attorneys probably are more committed to a favorable outcome in a particular case
than are busy prosecutors who are not directly accountable to a constituency. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying
text. As previously discussed, a high degree of commitment to an issue can increase a negotiator's relative bargaining
power. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Despite these two factors, prosecutors have substantially more power
than defendants in most cases.
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Professor Abraham Blumberg, after his exhaustive study of the criminal justice
system in an urban setting, noted that "lines of communication, influence, and
contact with those offices ... are essential to the practice of criminal law." 27'
According to Professor Blumberg, the lawyer who regularly works with criminal
cases needs to develop "an ongoing 'account' with the prosecution office which he
can draw upon from time to time to meet the exigencies of a particular case.' '272 This
need for a continuing positive working relationship coupled with the necessity of
disposing of a large number of cases leads to symbiotic relationships among the
prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge. Professors Arthur Rosett and Donald
Cressey describe the group comprised of these three actors as the "committee on
criminal justice.''273 According to Professors Rosett and Cressey, these parties
develop an accomodative working relationship: "Day by day, judges, prosecutors,
defenders, and probation officers encounter the same basic types of cases .... In
time, courthouse workers develop a group sense of justice. They come to understand
each other and learn to take each other's views into account." '2 74
A primary reason for the courthouse subculture is the defense attorney's need,
as well as the prosecutor's, to dispose of cases quickly. This pressure to reach
agreement is an additional, independent reason to adopt a cooperative approach. 275
Defense attorneys cannot afford to use competitive tactics and risk stalemate, because
their time limitations permit them to try only a few cases. Professors Rosett and
Cressey state that if plea bargaining participants were to employ competitive strate-
gies, then "the workday of the courthouse would be so crammed with bluffs, counter
bluffs, and counter-counter bluffs, that there would be no time for dispositions.' '276
Although many of the described factors may suggest the adoption of a noncom-
petitive strategy, the defense attorney's need to maintain good rapport with a client
271. A. BLUMBERG. CRIMINAL JUsCE 47 (1967).
272. Id. at 105. Professor Alschuler convincingly argues that the public defender's need to maintain a good working
relationship results in a severe ethical problem:
Perhaps the most common criticism of public defender systems is that defenders sacrifice some clients for
the benefit of others. A defender assigned to a particular courtroom may well see more of the prosecutor assigned
to that courtroom than he does of his wife, and when adversaries in the criminal justice system become too close,
they may choose to help each other at the expense of the persons and the interests that they have been hired to
serve. Moreover, with a grinding, overwhelming caseload, a public defender may "play for the average" and
fail to represent individual clients with the vigor demanded by elementary concepts of professional responsi-
bility.
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1210 (1975). See generally id. at
1210-24.
273. A. Rosmrr & D. C EssEY, supra note 247, at 173.
274. Id. at 85-86. Unfortunately, defense attorneys face a variety of subtle, and not so subtle, pressures to maintain
a noncompetitive orientation with the prosecutor other than those dictated by the best interests of their clients. See id. at
126-27. Defense attorneys are more likely to identify with judges and prosecutors who represent law abiding society than
with criminals from the lower class. Their careers and their social lives may be furthered by a cooperative orientation;
cooperation makes it possible to dispose of cases more quickly. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text. Even if
the use of a cooperative strategy may be motivated by the wrong reasons, however, it does not necessarily follow that a
competitive strategy would serve clients' interests better. See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
Not surprisingly, the relationships between the prosecutor and the public defenders who work with her are generally
more accommodative and less adversarial than relationships between the prosecutor and private attorneys. See Alschuler,
supra note 272, at 1210-24; Kray & Berman, Plea Bargaining in Nebraska-The Prosecutor's Perspective, 11 cRIG r'ON
L. REv. 94, 128-29 (1977).
275. See A. RosEr & D. CnEssEY, supra note 247, at 104-08, 127-28; Alschuler, supra note 272, at 1248-55.
276. A. Rosmrr & D. CO.ssEY, supra note 247, at 108.
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who is hostile toward the prosecutor may lead him to employ a different approach.
A competitive strategy is probably advantageous to convince the client that the
attorney is "on his side.' '277 Defendants are very critical of plea bargaining, usually
because they perceive that their attorneys are insufficiently adversarial in representing
their interests and are too inclined to sell-out their interests. 278 One defendant in a
survey conducted by Professor Jonathan Casper complained that the public defender's
first thought is to "cop out.' '279 This attitude may be exacerbated if the defense
attorney adopts a noncompetitive strategy.
Finally, in choosing between a competitive and a noncompetitive strategy, the
defense attorney should consider the norms that govern the tenor of the relationship
between the prosecutor and the defense attorney in plea bargaining.280 Generally,
prosecutors expect that defense attorneys will be cooperative in plea bargaining;281
they punish attorneys who are too adversarial in representing their clients by refusing
to grant the typical plea bargaining concessions to these attorneys' clients.2 82
The issues negotiated in plea bargaining are predominantly zero-sum issues,2 83
but some opportunities for integrative bargaining may exist. At first glance, it appears
inherently difficult to reconcile the interests of an accused murderer and a prosecutor,
pressured by an outraged community to convict the defendant, and to find a solution
that will benefit both negotiators. Most cases, however, will offer some potential for
integrative bargaining, because the prosecutor and the defendant prioritize the issues
at stake differently. Prosecutors are most interested in obtaining a conviction,2 84 while
defendants are most interested in minimizing the length of the sentence. 285 Guilty plea
agreements that allow the prosecutor to convict a defendant on a charge which
accurately reflects the seriousness of the crime but that provides for a comparatively
light sentence (that is, a light sentence recommendation or a light sentence contained
in the statute to which the defendant pleads guilty) may serve the interests of both the
prosecutor and the defendant. All parties may also want to avoid the expense, anxiety,
and time consumed by litigation. Finally, an inventive defense attorney can use the
277. See generally A. BLUMBERO. supra note 271, at 88-94; J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE. THE DEFENDANTS
PERSPEcTIvE 77-92 (1972); Alschuler, supra note 272, at 1241-48. Professor Alschuler quite correctly observes that many
defense attorneys who use a cooperative strategy for the wrong reasons are "selling out" the interest of their clients.
Alschuler, supra note 272, at 1209-13, 1219-24; see also Gifford, supra note 253, at 49-51.
278. See A. BLUMBERG, supra note 271, at 88; J. CASPER, supra note 277, at 77-92; Alschuler, supra note 272, at
1241-48.
279. J. CAsPER, supra note 277, at 107.
280. Other, more substantive, plea bargaining norms suggest how a particular case ought to be resolved, i.e., "what
is the case worth?" Hyman, Bargaining and Criminal Justice, 33 Ruross L. REv. 3, 37 (1980). For example, when the
defendant is charged with two counts, burglary and grand theft, the going rate might be that the prosecutor routinely will
accept a plea to one count of grand theft. Id. at 32-38. The prevailing norm might also suggest that further reductions are
possible when certain mitigating factors, such as the lack of a prior record, exist. See supra notes 259-61 and
accompanying text.
281. See A. RosErr & D. CRESSEY, supra note 247, at 90-92; Hyman, supra note 280, at 36-37.
282. See M. HEUstaNN, supra note 247, at 61-69; see also infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
284. See White, supra note 245, at 445-48.
285. See M. HEUMANN, supra note 247, at 69-70.
STRATEGY SELECTION IN LEGAL NEGOTIATION
integrative techniques of brainstorming to generate nonincarceration sanctions, such
as restitution.28 6
Application of the factors used in choosing a negotiation strategy to the situation
generally facing the defense attorney in plea bargaining suggests the adoption of a
predominantly cooperative strategy coupled with some early competitive tactics and
integrative solutions whenever feasible. 287 Of course, other factors in a particular case
that are inconsistent with the characteristics of the typical plea bargaining system
described above, such as a case in which there is a good chance of acquittal at trial
or a case that involves a prosecutor who is personally very competitive or antago-
nistic, should cause an attorney to modify the recommended strategy. Nevertheless,
in the same way that cross-examination tactics recommended by trial practice
teachers 288 can be generally followed by the trial attorney, the recommendations for
a plea bargaining strategy discussed above should form the foundation for a defense
attorney's effective plea bargaining strategy. Of course, the defense attorney's
negotiation strategy always must be determined within the parameters established by
the client.2 89
In the early phases of the negotiation, the defense attorney should begin with a
competitive strategy, but in a cooperative style. Even though several practice manuals
suggest that defense attorneys should be extremely cooperative and seek to achieve
a guilty plea agreement early in plea bargaining, 290 negotiation theory establishes at
least four reasons that the defense attorney's early tactics should be competitive. First,
the government's opening demand, usually characterized by overcharging and ex-
cessively long legislatively-determined prison sentences, is very competitive. 29' As
previously discussed, a negotiator who uses a cooperative strategy against a com-
petitive negotiator is severely disadvantaged. 292 Thus, a defense attorney risks
exploitation if he begins negotiations with a cooperative strategy. Second, the
defendant usually has low bargaining power; some social scientists recommend that
the less powerful negotiator begin competitively and become more cooperative later
in the negotiation. 293 Third, it may be necessary to adopt a competitive strategy
286. See A. AmsrmssAm, supra note 249, § 211; Penn, supra note 250, §§ 13.12-. 13; see also supra notes 114-17
and accompanying text.
287. The recommended strategy, therefore, follows Professor Pruitt's strategic choice model, which allows the
negotiator to use different negotiating strategies sequentially within a single negotiation. See D. PRuITT, supra note 19,
at 15; see also supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text. The described strategy also is consistent with Professor Pruitt's
observation that negotiations frequently progress from a competitive stage to a less competitive stage. See D. PRUrrr, supra
note 19, at 132-35; see also supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
288. For example, trial attorneys are admonished to use predominately leading questions when cross-examining a
witness. See. e.g., P. BERGmAN. TRIAL ADVOCACY. IN A NirrTSHELL 172-82 (1979); J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY 315-16
(1975); T. MAuEr. FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 247-48 (1980). However, in a few instances, such as when the
answer to the question is already known or is unimportant, or when an unexpected answer defies common sense, a
nonleading question can be used. See J. JEAs, supra, at 316; T. MAuET, supra, at 248. As in the case of recommended
negotiation strategies, recommendations for the style of questions for cross-examination are not based on formal binding
rules of evidence. Rather, they are based on predictions about how people behave, specifically how witnesses will respond
to the questions, and how jurors will respond to the questions and answers.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
290. See, e.g., A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 249, § 201.
291. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
293. See Hamner & Baird, supra note 176, at 265; see also supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
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initially to communicate to the prosecutor that the attorney intends to zealously
represent the client294 and that he will not "cave in" because of his caseload or other
personal or institutional pressures. Finally, early competitive moves often convince
the client that his attorney intends to represent him vigorously; this improves client
relations.
A competitive strategy is recommended for the defense attorney early in plea
bargaining but the question remains: What specific competitive tactics should be
used? The defense attorney should attempt to obtain unilateral concessions from the
prosecutor by asking the prosecutor about her sense of "what the case is worth" and
what charge reductions she can make, without indicating the defendant's willingness
to plead to any charge at all. 295 Similarly, in the early stages of negotiation, the
defense attorney should seek the fullest possible discovery from the prosecutor. At the
same time, he should withhold, or only selectively disclose, his client's version of the
facts and other evidence available to him. 296 The attorney can also reduce the
prosecutor's power advantage by insisting that the prosecutor deal only with provable
offenses and with a realistic penalty, instead of with overcharges and the statutorily
defined penalty maximums. 297
Most important, defense attorneys should raise with the prosecutor valid de-
fenses, motions, and other issues as part of their negotiation strategy. Doing so,
however, can entail considerable risks and costs for defense attorneys. Judges and
prosecutors sometimes view such motions and legal challenges with hostility,298 and
they may retaliate against the defense attorney later in the plea bargaining process by
refusing to make discretionary reductions based on the equities of the case. Defense
attorneys who file motions that prosecutors view as frivolous may never get a break
in plea bargaining. Accordingly, the defense attorney should pursue viable legal
issues, but should try to maintain a cooperative relationship with the prosecutor.
Sometimes the defense attorney can informally raise legal challenges to the
294. See D. PRurrr, supra note 19, at 134-35; see also supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
295. See A. AMSTRDAM, supra note 249, § 209.
296. A majority of prosecutors surveyed in Oregon indicated that it was proper for the defense attorney to withhold
information during plea bargaining. Klonoski, Mitchell & Gallagher, supra note 246, at 125. As previously discussed,
the competitive negotiator seeks to gain information from his opponent at the same time he withholds information from
his opponent. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text. For example, when the prosecutor has overcharged in an
assault case, the defense attorney's opening position should be, "What we're really dealing with here is a simple assault,
not a felonious assault; we both recognize that." The defendant's perception of the prosecutor's relative power will be
diminished greatly if the defense attorney explains overcharging, the offenses that are provable, and that the likely
sentences to be imposed are much shorter in length than the prosecutor suggests. These bluff-calling tactics are competitive
tactics. The defense attorney can also reduce the prosecutor's power advantage by developing a reputation as a competent
trial attorney who is willing to try cases, see A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 249, § 101, and by investigating and preparing
each case fully, see F. BAILEY & H. RoSENBLArr, supra note 251, at 20.
298. See M. HEUMANN, supra note 247, at 61-75. Professor Heumann found that defense attorneys who filed
numerous motions were punished by prosecutors, who refused to make favorable sentence recommendations, to reduce
charges in plea bargaining, and to disclose information about cases. Judges also punished these defense attorneys, and their
clients, by increasing the length of the defendants' sentences after trial. One public defender told Professor Heumann:
I went up to introduce myself to thejudge, and there were some other attorneys in there . . . . [Tlhe judge said:
"Well, we'll see you tomorrow and, well, just play along with everyone else. Don't file a lot of motions ....
Don't mess around like those legal-aid attorneys, filing all their motions. Don't file a lot of motions and don't
make a lot of noise."
Id. at 63.
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government's case. If legal challenges are presented in this manner, the prosecutor is
often more willing to make appropriate dismissals or reductions than if a formal
motion is filed in court.299 In addition, the defense attorney can often place on an
obstreperous client the responsibility for competitive tactics, such as refusing to enter
pleas or raising certain defenses, and still maintain a cordial personal working
relationship with the prosecutor. 3° °
It is important to reiterate the distinction between negotiation strategy and
negotiation style. 301 If an attorney hopes to appeal to the prosecutor's equitable
discretion later in the negotiation, his personal style should be accomodative, not
antagonistic. The defense attorney should attempt to argue defenses and other legal
issues vigorously, while maintaining cordial personal relationships. An attorney with
an accommodative personal style can often switch from a competitive to a cooperative
strategy during a negotiation. It is more difficult for an antagonistic attorney to build
a relationship on trust and seek discretionary favors from a prosecutor later in a
negotiation.
Following the initial stages of plea bargaining, virtually all the factors discussed
previously suggest adopting a noncompetitive strategy for plea bargaining. Usually
the cooperative strategy will be more effective than the integrative strategy, although
some opportunities for integrative solutions may exist. 302 The following factors
suggest the adoption of a noncompetitive strategy:
(1) the prosecutor will probably use a cooperative strategy;
(2) the prosecutor has greater bargaining power;
(3) an amicable continuing relationship between the defense attorney and the prosecutor
should be maintained;
(4) various pressures to reach agreement exist; and
(5) the prevailing norms in plea bargaining mandate the use of cooperative tactics.
The prosecutor's use of a cooperative strategy supports the adoption of a
noncompetitive strategy. In most cases, the prosecutor views her role as one requiring
her to individualize justice by taking into account the circumstances of the offense and
the characteristics of the offender.303 Prosecutors will react more favorably in this role
if defense attorneys appear to be working with them to evaluate the culpability of the
defendant. If the probable outcome of the case is a plea by the defendant, the defense
attorney should share information freely with the prosecutor 30 4 and seek to identify
those mitigating factors that would induce the prosecutor to make bargaining con-
cessions.
Finally, the defense attorney should urge integrative solutions whenever feasi-
ble. Often plea bargaining is not a zero-sum situation, 305 and the defense attorney
should seek agreements in appropriate cases that allow the prosecutor to obtain a
299. See id. at 72.
300. See A. AMMtERDAM, supra note 249, § 212.
301. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text; see also Allen & Strickland, supra note 250, at 39-40.
305. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
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conviction at the same time that the client is protected from a long prison term.
Restitution and other alternatives to incarceration may satisfy both the prosecutor's
need for a sanction and the defendant's desire to avoid incarceration.
Both the competitive and the noncompetitive strategies have advantages and
disadvantages in plea bargaining. In a particular case, one aspect of the bargaining
context may suggest the adoption of one strategy over the other. If the prosecutor's
case is weak and conviction is unlikely, the use of a competitive strategy becomes
more attractive. If an inexperienced prosecuting attorney wants to gain more trial
experience, a defense attorney's cooperative strategy is unlikely to yield substantial
concessions. When deciding on a negotiating strategy, the defense attorney should
always determine the factors that distinguish the instant case from the usual plea
bargaining situation. If these factors are important, the attorney may want to modify
the suggested strategy. Even if the attorney modifies the recommended strategy in a
particular case with unusual characteristics, however, this recommendation at least
provides the criminal defense attorney with a starting point. Thus, this proposed
strategy is a more useful tool for the practicing criminal defense attorney than either
a mere list of factors to be applied on an ad hoc basis or the admonishment that he
will learn to plea bargain as he gains experience.
In summary, negotiation theory suggests that the plea bargaining strategy most
likely to succeed in a typical case is one which begins with a competitive approach
and progresses to a cooperative approach as negotiations continue. To accomplish this
strategy switch, the defense attorney should attempt to maintain a cordial and
accommodative relationship with the prosecutor, even during the early phases of
bargaining. It is difficult to compare this strategy with the "state of the art"
recommendations of practicing criminal defense attorneys, because practicing law-
yers give inconsistent advice. Some commentators recommend a cooperative strategy
designed to reach an agreement as quickly as possible; 306 others suggest that
cooperating with the prosecutor is equivalent to selling out.30 7 The strategy recom-
mended above, however, appears likely to be the most effective in the plea bargaining
context.
C. The Plaintiffs Strategy in Personal Injury Negotiations
The plaintiff's personal injury attorney encounters systemic characteristics dif-
ferent from those encountered by the defense attorney in plea bargaining. These
characteristics generally suggest a somewhat different strategy than that recom-
mended for plea bargaining. In particular, the greater bargaining power of the
plaintiff's attorney, the greater likelihood that the opponent will use competitive
tactics, and the lesser importance of a continuing relationship with the other negotiator
may all suggest that a competitive strategy is more advantageous in personal injury
306. See Penn, supra note 250, § 13.7; see also Allen & Strickland, supra note 250, at 39.
307. See Alschuler, supra note 272, at 1312. See generally Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The Defense Attorney,
and The Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 42-48 (1975); Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A. J.
621, 622 (1976); Bosco, Some Comments Concerning the Roles of Judges, Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys in Plea
Bargaining, 1978 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 377, 408-10.
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negotiations than in plea bargaining. This recommendation assumes a personal injury
case of significant value; in the small or medium-sized case, economic reality dictates
settlement because the costs of litigation exceed the value of the claim. 308 As a result,
negotiations of smaller claims, at least between experienced negotiators, are likely
typified by the use of a cooperative strategy309 and an attempt to find a fair and just
value for the claim.
The plaintiff's attorney probably will be negotiating with two different repre-
sentatives of the defendant's insurance company-the claims adjuster (prior to the
filing of a lawsuit) and the attorney hired by the insurance company. Professor H.
Laurence Ross, a social scientist who has studied the claims process in great detail,
concludes that for these individuals, "organizational pressure would seem to be a
more important factor than personality in affecting the outcome of claims.' '310 Certain
structural characteristics of the claims adjustment process suggest that the claims
adjuster's strategy will be competitive; other pressures on the adjuster, however,
influence him to adopt a cooperative strategy.
The adjuster will likely begin the negotiations with a competitive strategy.
Claims adjusters are trained to settle cases quickly with the claimant for an amount
far less than an attorney, once retained, would regard as a fair settlement value. 31
Quite frequently, the claims adjuster begins competitively and argues that if the
claimant were to hire an attorney, then the attorney would "take half" and leave the
claimant with less than if she were to settle immediately. 312 Even after the claimant
hires an attorney, adjusters often test the plaintiff's attorney with competitive tactics
to determine whether the attorney, because she is naive, unprepared, or impatient,
will settle for less than the fair value of the case. 31 3 More generally, the adjuster's
adversarial orientation causes him to disbelieve the claimant's position until more
facts are revealed as a result of discovery and further investigation. 314
The relationship between the claims adjuster and the insurance company facil-
itates the use of the competitive strategy, because the adjuster's power to make
concessions is limited. His settlement authority frequently is strictly confined;
therefore, he cannot reciprocate the concessions made by the plaintiff's counsel
without consulting his superiors. 315 In addition, insurance companies may set the
reserve316 on a case unrealistically low so that the plaintiff's demand can be met with
308. An insurance company reports that 60% of its liability cases are settled before the filing of a lawsuit. See A.
AVERBACH. HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES § 176 (1973).
309. See id. § 182; see also 4 J. KEULNER. PERSONAL INJURY. SUCCESSFUL mGATION TECHNIQUES 1453 (1978); H. Ross.
SETLED OUT OF COURT. THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAtMS ADJUSTMENTS 20-21 (1970); Davis, Settlement
Negotiations: Strategy and Tactics, TRIAL, July 1983, at 82, 83.
310. H. Ross, supra note 309, at 235.
311. See generally id. at 45-54.
312. J. SINDELL & D. SINvEt. LET'S TALK SErn.xe2er. ThE PREPARATION. NEGOTIATION AND STTLENT OF
PLAINTIFFS' PERSONAL INJURY CASES 312 (1963).
313. Id. at 309-13.
314. See A. CONE & V. LAWYER. THE CoMPLETE PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE MANUAL 165 (1983).
315. See id. at 164-65.
316. A reserve is the amount an insurance company sets aside, after receiving a claim, to pay the eventual settlement
or judgment. J. KELNER, supra note 309, at 1469.
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the statement that "our reserve is only $15,000."' 317 These techniques constitute a
competitive tactic known as the "negotiation without authority" ploy. 318 Similarly,
while the insurance adjuster conceals his own information, he typically expects the
plaintiff's attorney to disclose the fruits of her investigation. 31 9
After the plaintiff's attorney demonstrates that she understands the value of the
case, the adjuster will probably negotiate cooperatively 320 and yield to the pressure to
settle quickly as many cases as possible. 32 t As a result, insurance companies pay
many questionable claims. In serious cases, "danger value" may be paid, even in the
absence of apparent liability, to avoid the risk that a jury might be swayed by
sympathy for the severely injured plaintiff and award her a substantial sum. 322
Conversely, in small cases of questionable liability, "nuisance value" is paid because
the costs of processing and trying the case exceed the settlement value for the case. 323
In addition, claims adjusters often desire to be fair to injured claimants, even in the
absence of clear liability; thus, some minimal payment to an injured plaintiff, when
liability is questionable or nonexistent, may nonetheless be a good business prac-
tice.324 The pressure on the claims adjuster to settle cases and his desire to be fair
suggest that he will adopt a predominantly cooperative strategy in the later phases of
negotiation. 325
In summary, the conflicting pressures on the insurance adjuster to adopt a
competitive strategy or a noncompetitive strategy are generally resolved in two ways.
First, the claims adjuster likely will begin with a competitive strategy and become
more cooperative as the negotiation progresses. Second, the claims adjuster probably
will behave in accordance with the following principle: If cases can be settled
inexpensively they should be, but in any event, they should be settled.
Less has been written about the negotiating strategy likely to be used by counsel
for the insurance company or the pressures affecting his choice of strategy. The
strategy actually used by insurance defense attorneys includes several competitive
tactics. Their initial offers are generally quite low. 326 Settlement rarely occurs early
in the process; significant offers are often not made until discovery is completed and
the parties are figuratively, and often literally, on the courthouse steps. 327 The
317. See id. at 1470.
318. See H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, supra note 3. at 119.
319. See J. SINDELL & D. SINDELL, supra note 312, at 315-16. One practitioner recommends: "Never discuss liability
with a claims adjuster. He will not be convinced by anything you say, and you will not learn anything about his file by
such discussion. You may, however, disclose some facts that will be utilized against you." A. AVERBACH, supra note 308,
§ 190.
320. See Davis, supra note 309, at 83-84; Schneider & Mone, A Positive Approach to Torts Settlements, PRAc, LAW.,
Mar. 1971, at 27, 30-31.
321. See H. Ross, supra note 309, at 127-31, 235-36; Kelner, Techniques of Settlement, 1966 PERSONAL INJURY
ANNUAL 771, 777.
322. See H. Ross, supra note 309, at 199.
323. Id. at 204; see also supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
324. See generally H. Ross, supra note 309, at 46-54.
325. Id. at 65-66.
326. See Davis, supra note 309, at 84; Schneider & Mone, supra note 320, at 31-33.
327. See Kelner, supra note 321, at 773, 792.
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insurance company's defense attorney also uses delay tactics to press an injured and
incapacitated defendant toward early settlement. 328
As trial approaches, however, the defense attorney's strategy usually becomes
cooperative. The defense counsel recognizes that juries tend to overestimate the
impartial value of a case because they sympathize with injured plaintiffs and dislike
insurance companies. 329 Furthermore, the attorney knows that his client, the insur-
ance company, desires to avoid, if possible, the attorney's fees associated with
trial. 330 Finally, the insurance company has a legal obligation to accept any reasonable
settlement offer within the policy limits. 33' These reasons suggest that immediately
preceding trial, attorneys representing insurance companies are likely to pursue a
cooperative strategy and seek a fair and just result.
The second factor that affects the choice of a negotiation strategy, the relative
power between the two negotiators, is much different in the personal injury context
than in the plea bargaining situation. Usually the personal injury plaintiff has greater
negotiating power, but the plaintiff's power varies greatly according to the strength
of her case. When the plaintiff's attorney negotiates with the claims adjuster, she has
two viable alternatives to a negotiated agreement with the adjuster: further negotia-
tions with the defendant's attorney and trial. On the other hand, the claims adjuster
who fails to achieve agreement must report to his superior and explain the failure to
close the case and the implicit necessity of paying attorney's fees. All of the
previously described pressures on the claims adjuster to settle cases, coupled with the
likelihood of a sympathetic jury, increase the plaintiff's attorney's advantage. 332 Of
course, if the plaintiff has a weak case that is unlikely to survive a motion for
summary judgment or a motion for a directed verdict, then the power advantage is
reversed. Generally though, the personal injury attorney's bargaining power advan-
tage over the insurance company suggests that she has the option of choosing between
the competitive and cooperative strategies. 333
Considerations of a possible continuing relationship between the negotiating
parties 334 probably is not as important in selecting a negotiation strategy in personal
injury negotiations as it is in plea bargaining. In personal injury claims, as in plea
328. Schneider & Mone, supra note 320, at 31-32.
329. See H. Ross, supra note 309, at 112.
330. See Gosney, How Insurance Companies Can Reduce Litigation Costs, 31 FEwN INS. CoUNs- Q. 291, 291
(1981).
331. See Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 907. 912 (9th Cir. 1978); Beck v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut.
Casualty Ins. Co., 429 F.2d 813. 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Young v. American Casualty Co.. 416 F.2d 906. 910 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 997 (1970). See generally A. WINDT. INSURANCE LAIMS AND DISPUrs. REPRESENTATION
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS 186-89 (1982).
332. See Schneider & Mone, supra note 320, at 31.
333. See supra text accompanying note 170.
334, Professor Ross argues that this factor has no significance at all in choosing a strategy in personal injury
litigation:
Bodily injury negotiation is generally a one-time affair, particularly in urban areas where reputations of
individuals and even of companies are slow to spread. There is relatively little to be gained or lost in the way
of a reputation through the use and display of integrity or determination in this situation.
H. Ross, supra note 309, at 143-44.
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bargaining, 335 but unlike labor relations, 336 the parties themselves almost never have
a continuing relationship: the accident resulting in the personal injury is a one-time
affair. A continuing positive working relationship between the parties, which would
discourage using a competitive strategy, is not necessary. On the other hand, the
plaintiff's personal injury attorney may or may not have continuing contact with a
claims adjuster or a defense insurance attorney. To the extent that a continuing
relationship is probable, she may want to consider a noncompetitive strategy. 337
However, the degree of continuing contact between a personal injury plaintiff's
attorney and the insurance company's defense counsel generally is less than the daily
interaction between a prosecutor and a public defender. Therefore, this factor usually
will not be as significant in choosing the optimal strategy.
The amount of pressure on the plaintiff's personal injury attorney to settle also
varies greatly from case to case. In some cases, the injured client who does not have
funds to pay medical bills and living expenses pressures her attorney to settle her
claim expeditiously. However, injured plaintiffs usually receive some form of
financial assistance such as governmental social welfare benefits, first-party insurance
proceeds, or wage continuation plan benefits. These benefits significantly diminish
the financial pressure on the plaintiff to settle and make the competitive strategy more
viable even though it may delay the receipt of compensation. Judicial pressure to
settle during the later stages of personal injury negotiations, however, may dictate the
use of a cooperative strategy.
The personal injury attorney is accountable to her client; the need for a
harmonious relationship with the client generally influences the negotiator to adopt a
competitive strategy during the early phases of negotiations. 338 The plaintiff's
attorney is bound by the client's decisions regarding settlement; 33 9 because personal
injury negotiations usually involve a single, easily quantifiable issue and because the
client's predominant concern is the easily understood dollar amount of the settlement,
she probably will be knowledgeable about, and interested in, the various settlement
offers and counteroffers. Most personal injury plaintiffs are likely to have high
aspirations; many will remain angry at the defendant who injured them or the deep
pocket insurance company that initially made miserly offers because it pursued a
competitive strategy. The need to placate her client, therefore, may suggest that the
plaintiff's attorney adopt a competitive strategy. Later in the negotiations, especially
as trial approaches, plaintiffs frequently become less demanding, and the attorney
may change her strategy to a more cooperative approach.
The characteristics of personal injury litigation limit the feasibility of the
integrative strategy in most cases. Personal injury negotiation is predominantly a
335. The defendant in plea bargaining does not have an ongoing relationship with the prosecutor. However, the
defendant's attorney may have an interest in maintaining his working relationship with the prosecutor. See supra notes
271-74 and accompanying text.
336. See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
339. See MODEL RULES OF PRoFEssIoNAL CONDucT Rule 1.2 (1983); D. BItNDER & S. PRIcE, supra note 5, at 147-53;
see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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zero-sum negotiation; each dollar the plaintiff gains is a dollar loss to the defend-
ant.340 Generally, the only significant issue in controversy is the dollar amount of the
settlement. The single issue nature of the negotiation prevents the use of logrolling as
an integrative technique.
The above analysis suggests that the plaintiff's attorney should use a predomi-
nantly competitive strategy in personal injury negotiations. The plaintiff's attorney
who adopts a noncompetitive strategy will be severely disadvantaged when negoti-
ating against a claims adjuster or defense attorney who will probably use competitive
approaches. Further, the plaintiff's alternatives to a negotiated settlement are more
attractive than the criminal defendant's non-negotiation options, 341 so there is less risk
in using the competitive strategy in most cases, even if negotiations break down. The
lesser possibility of a continuing relationship between the negotiators and the heavier
pressure to settle personal injury cases 342 usually will not be sufficiently critical
factors to suggest a predominantly cooperative strategy. It is recommended, there-
fore, that the plaintiffs attorney use a competitive strategy in negotiations with the
claims adjuster and in the initial negotiations with opposing counsel. In the final
stages of negotiation, the plaintiffs attorney should shift to a cooperative strategy if
such a change is suggested by one or more of the following factors:
(1) opposing counsel uses a noncompetitive strategy;
(2) the case is weak and is unlikely to survive the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict;
(3) the client's immediate financial situation or other needs exert considerable pressure to
settle; or
(4) further competitive tactics will damage a continuing relationship with opposing
counsel, to the detriment of the present client and future clients.
The negotiation strategies recommended by personal injury specialists, 343 or
observed in actual practice by those who have studied personal injury negotiation, 344
closely mirror the one recommended above, even though personal injury lawyers have
not consciously applied the factors identified by social scientists to choose their
strategies. These pragmatic tacticians recommend that the personal injury attorney
present a high initial demand, 345 employ information gathering tactics in the early
phases of negotiation, 346 make threats, 347 make concessions only in response to the
340. To an extent, both the plaintiff and defendant benefit when the parties agree to a structured settlement. See
Staller, Struciured Settlements. in H. MILLER. ART OF AD\OCACY S-ffnsiEtrN §§ 10.00-. 140 (1983); see also supra note
225.
341. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
342. Of course, a client may want to settle the case expeditiously for a variety of nonfinancial reasons including a
desire to end the anxiety or inconvenience that accompanies litigation. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE. supra note 5. at 138-40.
147-55.
343. See generally H. MILLER. ART OF ADVOCACY S-rrLLMsrEr §§ 5.01-.35 (1983); J. SINDELL & D. SINDELL, siupra
note 312, Davis. supra note 309; Schneider & Mone. supra note 320.
344. See H. Ross, supra note 309. at 149-51.
345. See A. CONE & V. LAwvYER, supra note 314, at 166. H. MILLE. supra note 343. §§ 5.07-.08; H. Ross. supra
note 309, at 149-51; Davis, supra note 309. at 84; Kelner, supra note 321. at 787-88; Schneider & Mone. supra note
320. at 33-34.
346. See H. Ross. supra note 309. at 151-58; J. SINDLL & D. SINOELL. supra note 312. at 172.
347. See H. Ross. supra note 309. at 155-56; Schneider & Mone. supra note 320. at 33.
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opponent's concessions, 348 make only small concessions, 349 and delay settlement
until the last possible moment.350 In other words, real world practitioners recommend
using all of the tactics that constitute the competitive strategy. 35' That the competitive
strategy is currently the norm in personal injury negotiations provides yet another
reason for the personal injury attorney to use this strategy: to use a noncompetitive
strategy in a milieu in which attorneys expect the competitive strategy will severely
disadvantage the negotiator. 352 That the strategy recommended above is consistent
with the recommendations of leading personal injury specialists to use competitive
tactics in personal injury litigation also supports the validity of the method outlined
in this article for selecting an optimal, effective negotiation strategy in other sub-
stantive contexts.
D. Management's Strategy in Collective Bargaining
It is more difficult to recommend a general strategy for the management attorney
in labor negotiations than it is to recommend a general strategy for the criminal
defense attorney or the plaintiff's personal injury attorney. 353 Some factors present in
the labor negotiation setting strongly suggest that management's attorneys adopt a
competitive strategy, 354 while others suggest the use of a noncompetitive strategy. 355
A wide variety of negotiation strategies have been observed in practice, 356 and labor
348. See H. Ross, supra note 309, at 150; Davis, supra note 309, at 83.
349. See H. MILLER, supra note 343, § 5.09.
350. See J. SINDELL & D. SINDELL, supra note 312, at 373; Davis, supra note 309, at 84; Schneider & Mone, supra
note 320, at 31-32.
351. See generally A. CONE & V. LAWYER, supra note 314, at 164-66; H. MILLER, supra note 343, §§ 5.01-.35;
Davis, supra note 309; Kelner, supra note 321; Schneider & Mone, supra note 320. For a conflicting recommendation,
see Wallach, Settlement in a Personal Injury Case: The Imperfect Art, 1979 PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL 779.
352. See Kelner, supra note 321, at 776, 797; see also supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
353. The discussion in this part assumes that the collective bargaining occurs either shortly before the existing
contract between management and the union expires or immediately after the contract expires. For a brief, general
description of collective bargaining in this, the most common, situation, see generally J. ArTLmON. R. RABIN. G. Sc,,iszK.
H. SHERMtAN & E. SILVERSTEIN. COLLEctiVE BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYmENT 361-64 (2d ed. 1984). Typically, the
union will make the first demand. See id. at 362. Management is legally obligated to commence negotiations and negotiate
in good faith. See generally Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203. 204 (1964); Cox, The Dut to
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Gross, Cullen & Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations:
Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1009 (1968).
In the 1980s, a somewhat different type of labor negotiation has emerged. Many companies have pleaded financial
exigencies and have sought to reopen contract negotiations during the period covered by an existing contract in order to
seek economic concessions from the union. See generally Anderson, Challenges to Collective Bargaining, 31 LAB L.J.
470, 472 (1980); Beckman, Bargaining in an Uncertain Economic Arena-Job Security: The Focus of Union Initiative,
31 LAB L.J. 465, 469 (1980). In this situation, management obviously presents the first demand and the union is not
legally obligated to respond. See generally Driscoll, A Behavioral-Science View of the Future of Collective Bargaining
in the United States, 30 LAB. L.J. 433, 434-36 (1979).
354. See R. VALTON & R. McKERstE, supra note 34, at 270-73; Craft, Post-Recession Bargaining: Mutualism or
Adversarial Relations?, 34 LAB. L.J. 431 (1983).
355. See R. WALTON & R. MCKERStE, supra note 34, at 126-43; Yoder & Staudohar, Rethinking the Role of
Collective Bargaining, 34 LAB. L.J. 311,311-15 (1983). A stable and cooperative relationship between the employer and
its employees is generally important to both parties, see Mandler, Collective Bargaining Negotiations, in ILtLNotS INsr
FOR COwrlNUING LEGAL EDUC., supra note 2, § 14.1, because of the desire to increase employee morale and productivity
and to keep companies competitive, see Yoder & Staudohar, supra, at 311-13.
356. See Yoder & Staudohar, supra note 355; see also Baumgart & Compagnone, A Survey of Management and
Union Advocates' Attitudes About Strategies and Techniques in Labor Negotiation, in H. EDWARDS & J. WTrrE, supra note
3, at 306.
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specialists disagree on whether to recommend a competitive 357 or noncompetitive 358
strategy. Idiosyncratic factors also may be more important considerations in labor
negotiations than in other areas. 359 The existing negotiation norms have been
described nebulously as "antagonistic cooperation, ' 360 and as the "gray area be-
tween accommodation and confrontation.' '361
Labor negotiations consist of a mixture of zero-sum and non-zero sum issues. 362
The wage-benefit package363 is probably the most important issue in a majority of
collective bargaining negotiations; 364 to some extent, these compensation questions
resemble a zero-sum game365 in which the interests of the parties directly conflict.
Even here, however, opportunities to use the integrative technique of logrolling366
may exist. Management's underlying interest is often to minimize the total cost of the
wage-benefit package, while the union may be more concerned with a specific issue,
such as pensions, insurance, or vacations, that is highly visible to workers or that has
been the subject of prior union commitments to the rank and file. 367 Other issues in
labor negotiations, such as those relating to job security or productivity, offer even
more promise for integrative bargaining. Often the management and the union can
devise solutions that will improve both job satisfaction and productivity. Therefore,
labor negotiations are generally more hospitable to integrative bargaining than the
areas of negotiation previously discussed.
The situation facing the management attorney in negotiations is unlike those
previously discussed, because the relative bargaining power of the parties may vary
greatly from one negotiation to the next, 368 although it is likely to be relatively
balanced. 369 For both parties, the alternative to a negotiated settlement is a strike.
Innumerable patterns of relative strike costs exist depending on factors such as the
state of the economy, 370 the structure of the company,371 and the structure of
collective bargaining. 372 Generally a strike tends to hurt the workers only slightly at
the beginning, but more seriously as the strike progresses and the unemployed
357. See, e.g., Craft, supra note 354, at 431 (recommending a competitive strategy).
358. See, e.g., Yoder & Staudohar, supra note 355, at 311 (recommending a noncompetitive strategy).
359. See H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, supra note 3, at 260; Mandler, supra note 355, § 14.1.
360. E. BAKKE. MUTUAL SURVIVAL. THE GOAL OF UNIONS AND MANAGEMIENT 85 (1966); Craft, supra note 354, at 438.
361. Wynn, The Outlook for Collective Bargaining: Accommodation or Confrontation?, 31 LAB. L.J. 459 (1980);
see also H. EDWARDS & J. WHIE, supra note 3. at 259-60.
362. See generally R. vALTON & R. McKERsiE, supra note 34, at 161-62.
363. Wage-benefit packages include all forms of compensation for employees including not only wages, but also
pensions, insurance coverage, and vacation policies.
364. In the recession bound 1980s, however, job security has probably replaced the wage-benefit package as the
issue of first importance in labor negotiations.
365. See R. WALTON & R. McKERsIE, supra note 34, at 11-23; Yoder & Staudohar, supra note 355, at 311-15.
366. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
367. The concession by management on a single issue such as pensions serves as a face-saving gesture for the union
negotiator. See D. PRuIr, supra note 19, at 144-48; see also supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
368. See R. WALTON & R. McKEsSIE, supra note 34, at 32-37.
369. See id. at 400.
370. See id. at 34. Generally, unions have a power advantage in a strong economy because a strike injures the
company more than the workers. The company loses significant production, sales, and profits; on the other hand, workers
probably have savings available to use during the strike.
371. See id. For example, a strike atone plant ofa highly integrated company maybe disastrous to the manufacturer.
372. See id. at 35. The collective bargaining relationship is affected by factors such as the relative sizes of the union
and the employer.
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workers approach personal bankruptcy and face the psychological costs of enforced
leisure. 373 Conversely, unless the company has excess inventory, the company may
be hurt from the beginning. 374 No dominant pattern of relative disadvantage can be
identified across the spectrum of labor negotiations, except that usually neither party
wants a strike and the strike functions as a threat, a competitive tactic. Accordingly,
the relative bargaining power of neither union nor management is useful in recom-
mending an across-the-board labor negotiation strategy.
In labor negotiations, the relationships between the negotiators themselves and
between their principals are continuing ones; this is an important factor to consider in
choosing a negotiation strategy. A positive relationship between management and the
union that arises out of collective bargaining negotiations will contribute to the
harmonious treatment of workers' grievances and employee relations and will in-
crease morale and discipline. This relationship will also affect future bargaining. 375
These factors generally suggest the adoption of a noncompetitive strategy, 376 although
management may want to use some competitive tactics so that it does not appear to
be a pushover for future negotiations.
The opponent's likely strategy may be the most important factor in suggesting
a negotiation strategy for the management negotiator. The union negotiation strategy
will probably be a competitive one, because the union negotiator is highly accountable
to his constituency and the union rank and file members are generally more demand-
ing than union leaders. 377 Generally the management negotiator should initially
respond to the union's competitive strategy with her own competitive strategy. 378 By
making an initially competitive offer, the management attorney can help the union
negotiator lower the expectations of the workers and convince them that their initial
target is unrealistic. 379 At the beginning of the negotiations, the management nego-
tiator should also selectively share information with the workers so that their
expectations are reduced. 380
The management negotiator faces the dilemma of how to achieve the most
favorable contract possible, while avoiding a costly strike and maintaining good
relationships with the employees. If the management negotiator continues to respond
competitively to the high demands of the union negotiators early in the negotiations,
373. See id. at 32-33.
374. In a recession bound economy, management will not be hurt by a strike if replacement labor is readily available
to substitute for the strikers.
375. See R. WALTON & R. McKEsm, supra note 34, at 201-05.
376. See id. at 206. Sometimes, the management's relationship with the union may suggest using a competitive
negotiation strategy. Id. at 207. This might be true when management sees a chance to get rid of the union, the contract
to be negotiated sets a pattern for the industry, or employee relations is a separate and distinct issue from contract
negotiations.
377. See Baumgart & Compagnone, supra note 356, at 310; Mandler. supra note 355, § 14.4.
378. See R. WALTON & R. McKEst, supra note 34, at 283-89; Mandler, supra note 355, § 14.4. Conversely, if
the management negotiator perceives that union rank and file members believe the union's initial demands to be extreme.
then a cooperative initial offer by management may be suggested. This reasonable initial offer may cause workers to lose
faith in their union representatives and to exert pressure for a quick settlement.
379. See H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, supra note 3. at 260; R. WALTON & R. McKExsts. supra note 34, at 346; Mandler,
supra note 355, § 14.4; see also supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
380. See R. WALTON & R. McKERsui, supra note 34, at 325, 346; Fairweather, Labor Negotiation Strategy: A
Management Perspective, in H. EDWARoS & J. WtIT. supra note 3. at 300.
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she risks a breakdown. The conflicting pressures on management negotiators to adopt
competitive and noncompetitive strategies often lead labor negotiators to "tacit
communications" 38' and "off the record" talks. 382 A tacit communication. is a form
of veiled cooperative message sent by one negotiator to another and understood by
both. It communicates that publicly displayed competitive tactics are for the benefit
of the negotiator's consituency and should not be taken seriously by the opposing
negotiator. For example, Professors Richard Walton and Robert McKersie give an
example of the union negotiator who remarked after a tough bargaining session on
grievance problems, "Well, it's too early yet." 383 The message conveyed to the
experienced company lawyer was, "We may be bargaining aggressively, but a
movement in position will take place subsequently." 384 Labor negotiators also engage
in off the record conversations--communications in which no formal commitments
are made, but in which a problem solving approach predominates and the eventual
contours of an agreement often are decided. These two techniques allow the union
negotiator to publicly display the competitive tactics required to appease his constit-
uency, while also using a greater degree of cooperative and integrative bargaining to
move the parties toward agreement. The management negotiator may also aid the
union negotiator by publicly conceding an issue very grudgingly and making a big
issue of a small point.385 In this way, management's concession on the issue appears
to be a significant one and the employees should develop more positive feelings about
both their own negotiator's competence and the company's flexibility.
For the management attorney in labor negotiations, accountability to a constit-
uency probably does not influence the choice of strategy nearly as much as it does for
the union negotiator. 38 6 Management officials, while concerned with the final con-
tract, are probably not overly concerned with whether their negotiators appear to be
competitive or cooperative during the negotiations.
The analysis presented here suggests specific recommendations for management
negotiators which, taken together, fall short of constituting a comprehensive strategy,
but which nonetheless are important. In most negotiations, management's opening
public position on wages should be a competitive one. The competitive strategy will
likely achieve better results on wages, 387 give management the bargaining position to
make concessions, 388 and help reduce the employees' expectations. 389 As the nego-
tiation progresses, management's public bargaining position should remain compet-
itive, creating the appearance that concessions are being grudgingly granted and are
being forced by an aggressive and effective union negotiator. 390 However, simulta-
neously with public bargaining, the management negotiator should engage in off the
381. See R. VALTON & R. McKERSm, supra note 34, at 331-38, 347-49; Mandler, supra note 355, § 14.4.
382. See R. WVALToN & R. McKEPsIE, supra note 34, at 336-38; Mandler, supra note 355, § 14.10.
383. R. WALToN & R. McKEst, supra note 34, at 337.
384. Id.
385. See id. at 346-47; Baumgart & Compagnone, supra note 356, at 312.
386. See R. WALTO N & R. McKERsIE, supra note 34, at 298-302.
387. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
389. See C. STEvENS, supra note 135, at 67-69; Baumgart & Compagnone, supra note 356, at 309-10, 312.
390. See Baumgart & Compagnone, supra note 356, at 312; Mandler, supra note 355, § 14.8.
19851
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:41
record talks and tacit communications with the union negotiator. 391 Whether these
negotiations will be predominantly competitive or predominantly cooperative depends
on nonsystemic factors including the costs of a strike to each party, 392 the past
bargaining relationships between the principals, 393 and the personalities of the
negotiators. 394 Certainly on non-wage issues, integrative bargaining should play an
important role. 395
This recommended strategy of bifurcated public and private negotiations in the
labor field is an unusual response to the conflicting pressures exerted by the factors
used to select a negotiation strategy. The recommended strategy, however, is
consistent with the strategies observed in real world labor negotiations 396 and
recommended by labor law specialists. 397 The recommended strategy can perhaps,
after all, be accurately described as antagonistic cooperation. 398 In labor negotiations,
allowing any single factor to dictate a negotiation strategy could lead to costly
strikes399 or concessions that will be ultimately destructive to the company.4°°
V. CONCLUSION
The application of negotiating theory to the practice of law is only beginning to
emerge and develop from its embryonic stage. It is now possible to identify three
separate strategies: competitive, cooperative, and integrative. Until now, legal ne-
gotiation theory has lacked an effective and feasible model for deciding which
strategy to employ in any particular situation. Some proponents of each theory
claimed that their strategy was the most advantageous in all contexts. 40' In many
instances relying on this recommendation was worse than heeding no advice at all.
The criminal defense attorney, for example, who learned only competitive tactics and
391. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
392. See R. vALTON & R. McKERsE, supra note 34, at 32-37.
393. See id. at 360-79. Professors Walton and McKersie describe the evolution of the bargaining relationships
between the International Union of Electrical Workers and the General Electric Company, id. at 360-65. the United Auto
Workers and International Harvester, id. at 365-68, the United Auto Workers and Studebaker, id. at 368-72, the United
Auto Workers and General Motors, id. at 372-75, the United Steel Workers and the Steel Industry, id. at 375-77. the
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union and the \Vest Coast Shipping Companies. id. at 377-78, and
the United Packinghouse Workers and Armour, id. at 378-79.
394. See supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text; see also R. WALTON & R. McKEmRSI, supra note 34, at
193-200.
395. For example, integrative bargaining will be used to negotiate issues such as job conditions, see Gudenberg. New
Areas of Accommodation, 31 LAB. L.J. 462, 463-64 (1980); Yoder & Staudohar, supra note 355, at 313. and job security
and management flexibility, see R. WALTON & R. McKERsts, supra note 34, at 129-34.
396. See H. EDWARDS & J. WHtTE, supra note 3, at 259-60; R. WALTON & R. McKp.jtst supra note 34. at 378-79.
397. See R. WALTON & R. McKERStE, supra note 34, at 173-74, 182-83.
398. See E. BAKKE, supra note 360, at 85-116; Craft, supra note 354. at 438.
399. See, e.g., R. WALTON & R. McKEst, supra note 34, at 360-66, 375-77. Professors Walton and McKersie
describe the long and expensive strikes which occurred in the steel industry in 1959, id. at 375, at International Harvester
in the postwar period, id. at 365, and at General Electric in the late 1950s and early 1960s, id. at 360-64.
400. See, e.g., id. at 368-72. Professors Walton and McKersie use as an example the bargaining relationship
between the United Auto Workers and Studebaker which ultimately was partially responsible for the demise of the
company. The union-management relationship was regarded publicly as a cooperative one and received considerable
nationwide attention. In fact, management's bargaining strategy appears in retrospect to have been a cooperative strategy;
management's concessions were not reciprocated. As a result, Studebaker became uncompetitive. Id.
401. See, e.g.. R. FiSHER &W. URY. supra note 3. at xiii (principled negotiation which is based largely on integrative
theory); C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 25-26 (endorsing the competitive strategy); G. WiLUtAsts. supra note 3. at 41
(endorsing the cooperative strategy).
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then adopted a wholly competitive approach in plea bargaining, frequently received
fewer concessions from the prosecutor than the defense attorney who was unschooled
in negotiation theory and followed the method by which things had always been done.
Other lawyering skills theorists, most notably Professor Gary Lowenthal, moved legal
negotiation theory forward by suggesting that the strategy which is likely to be most
effective depends on the specific characteristics of a particular case. 402 Although more
sophisticated, this approach had limited practical utility because it required the
attorney engaged in negotiations to consider a variety of factors and decide, on an ad
hoc basis, which factors were most determinative before each negotiation. The lawyer
received no guidance on how to accomplish this.
This article suggests that individual negotiations can be categorized according to
the area of practice in which they occur. Within each specialty, certain systemic
characteristics recur; these constants make it possible to identify a negotiation strategy
likely to succeed in negotiations throughout an entire field. With this model, theory
and reality have merged. The theories of the social psychologists, when applied to
specific legal negotiation contexts, tell us what experienced and competent practi-
tioners always understood: an effective negotiation strategy for a personal injury
attorney differs from an effective strategy for a criminal defense attorney.
This article raises more questions than it answers. It does, however, suggest
ways that the theory presented can be both verified and broadened. Fortunately, the
possibility to empirically test the recommended negotiation strategies exists. Attor-
neys who frequently negotiate in a particular context, such as those with extensive
plea bargaining experience, could easily be surveyed to determine whether they
regard the purely competitive strategy, the purely cooperative strategy, or the hybrid
plea bargaining strategy outlined above 403 as the most likely strategy to yield
favorable results for defendants .404 An even more valid empirical project would be to
study the results of simulated negotiations between attorneys in which opposing
counsel would be instructed to use one of three strategies: a purely competitive
strategy, a purely cooperative strategy, or the strategy recommended in this article for
the particular type of negotiation. The results of the negotiations then could be
compared. 4° 5 The theory that effective negotiation strategies can be identified sys-
temically should also be tested in substantive contexts other than the three areas
discussed in this article.
The teaching and use of this context-based theory for choosing a negotiation
strategy should not, however, await empirical verification. It is far better to provide
402. See Lowenthal, supra note 5, at 69-92.
403. See supra notes 245-307 and accompanying text.
404. This approach was used in the first phase of Professor Williams' research on negotiating patterns of practicing
lawyers. See G. WLUAMS, supra note 3, at 15-16. Williams sent questionnaires to Phoenix and Denver attorneys asking
them to describe, according to 137 listed characteristics, the attorneys with whom they had negotiated and to rate the
negotiating effectiveness of their opponents. Subsequently, follow-up interviews were conducted with 45 Denver
attorneys. Id.
405. A similar type of empirical research using simulations was used previously to study which factors are important
to prosecutors when they decide to make bargaining concessions in plea bargaining. See Lagoy, Senna & Siegel, supra
note 252, at 442-45. In that study, randomly selected prosecutors were asked to decide which concessions were
appropriate in two simulated case histories and to indicate which factors influenced their decisions.
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lawyers and law students with a reasoned application of social scientists' theories to
legal negotiations than it is to shrug one's shoulders and say that every negotiation is
different or that negotiating skills are an art. The former is education; the latter denies
the relevance of education to what it is that lawyers do.
